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Abstract 
The information systems, the technologies, the laws on data privacy and data protection are 
continuously evolving. It becomes more and more complex to analyse and describe a system, 
and its relationship with others. Because of that, preventing all attacks and detecting the risks 
is becoming a very difficult task. Hopefully the methodologies to help in this field evolve too, 
new approaches are created every year. Unfortunately, this constant evolution makes it difficult 
to choose the correct tool, methodology, framework to ensure the risk management on a project 
or on an organisation level. This thesis intends to offer to the reader a first step and guidance in 
his choice regarding the context. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Goal 
Today the risk management became a very sensitive subject for the industry. More and more 
information systems are the target of cyber-attacks with huge financial and human 
consequences. According to an IBM security study published in 2018, the average cost of a data 
breach is $3.86 million.  But the cost of “mega breaches,” where 1 million to 50 million records 
are lost, can cost from $40 million up to $350 million. To these amounts we must add all the 
hidden cost such as bad reputation, the implementation of the recovery plan etc. 
Hopefully we have a lot of different methodologies to help us assess and manage the risks and 
threats. One could even say that there are too many methodologies existing for someone who 
starts in this domain and would like to inform himself. It is very difficult to choose the right 
one when you do not know about the others. Worse than that, if the choice is not appropriate 
for the project, the risks could be ignored or not detected. Therefore, the choice must be made 
at the beginning of the project after having taken into consideration all the aspects of the project. 
Also, another crucial argument saying that the risk management should be performed from the 
beginning, is that according to Microsoft, the cost of implementing the security in a deployed 
solution is up to 30 times more than if it was done at the start phase of the project. 
The goal of this thesis is to help people understand what risk management is and have an idea 
of the existing tools and approaches that are at their disposition to manage the risks in their 
project and help them choose the right tool according to their context. The risk management 
tools will be compared to another approach, threat modelling, to determine what really the 
differences are and see if they are complementary or redundant. 
Due to the huge number of existing methodologies, this thesis will not analyse all of them but 
select a sample of the most representative solutions. Once the approach is selected, the user will 
have to continue investigating if other tools exist which have not been developed here. 
Research questions 
The main research question of this thesis is what are the differences between risk management 
and threat modelling? One sub question tends to discover if the two approaches are redundant 
or complementary. To answer to these questions, the first thing we need before starting is to 
clearly define what risk management and threat modelling are, what are the different 
implementations that exist to use them. 
Then we will analyse the different sorts of risk management methodologies that can be used for 
a project or organisation. Therefore, we will analyse four risk management methodologies that 
are used in the industry. For each of them, we will describe them and try to see what their 
strengths and their weaknesses are.  
Afterwards we will analyse five of the existing tools to do threat modelling. Like for the risk 
management methodology, we will define them, try to find their strengths and their weaknesses. 
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Another part of this thesis will be to experiment one risk management methodology and one 
threat modelling methodology for the same use case in order to confirm what we discovered 
with the analysis of the different tools.  
To compare those tools, we will define search criteria. They will allow us to do a first 
comparison between the risk management methodology and threat modelling and try to see if 
their results are complementary or redundant.  
Roadmap of this thesis 
This thesis contains seven chapters. First, we have the introduction to the subject. Then we have 
the second chapter which will define the study concepts, the description and the analysis of the 
concept we will use. Later in chapter three, different risk management methodologies will be 
selected, analysed and evaluated with predefined criteria. In chapter four, we will do the same 
but with threat modelling methodologies. In chapter five, an experimentation of one risk 
management methodology and one threat modelling technique will be done on the same use 
case. In chapter six we will compare the risk management and the threat modelling approaches 
with all the criteria and points we analysed in chapter three, four and the experimentation in 
chapter five. Finally, we will finish this thesis by the conclusions in chapter seven. 
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Chapter 2: Risk, risk management and 
threat modelling 
In this chapter the terms used will be defined and a first analysis of risk management and threat 
modelling method in general will be done by explaining the different approaches for each of 
them, why they are important and what they offer. 
Risk 
The first thing we must understand and agree on when we speak about risk management is of 
course what is the definition of a risk? And by risk we are talking about project risks. According 
to the project management institute a “project risk is an uncertain event or condition that, if it 
occurs, has an effect on at least one project objective”.  In a project there is an infinite number 
of risks, all with different level of severity, probability. To control a project, it is important to 
be aware of those risk and if necessary, mitigate them or on the contrary exploit them. 
Therefore, we have different methodology to help us to do risk management. 
Risk management 
The risk management is a process which will allow to minimise the risks and take advantage of 
the opportunities. It is important that this process is applied during the entire life-cycle of the 
project. For certain part like data protection it is even a legal obligation if you want to respect 
the new regulation (GDPR). In any case this process is essential if a company wants to have a 
good governance.  
Risk management approach 
One of the most important part in the process of risk management is the risk assessment. It is 
an activity where the risks will be identified and assessed. Contrary to the risk management the 
risk assessment is not continuous, it is only done when required. This activity will allow to 
produce a document with security requirements to mitigate the identified risks. This document 
will be used in the context of the project but could also be used to help management to make 
strategic decisions, to modify the company privacy policy etc. The goal of the risk management 
in general is not to have a plan to avoid all the negative risks but to have a risk plan that allows 
to have an acceptable level of security. In figure 1 we can see the different activities that 
compose the risk management process. 
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Figure 1: Risk management activities 
 
1. Identify: this is the most important step of the risk assessment. During this step the 
vulnerabilities and their origin are identified. 
2. Assess: this step will allow to assess the probability and the impact if the event occurs. 
Based on this assessment the risk will be sorted by cost for example and then prioritised. 
This step helps to decide which risk needs to have a mitigation plan. 
3. Risk planning: it is in this step that the mitigation plans for the risks will be decided. 
4. Implementation: the strategies are implemented. 
5. Monitoring: follow the project if a change can raise new risks. 
6. Control: if a change is made, a control is performed to see whether a risk assessment is 
necessary or not. 
 
Approaches for security risk assessment 
As we can see in figure 1 the risk assessment is a crucial part of the risk management. In this 
step the risks are identified and analysed to assess their probability and the lost they can cause. 
It will help the project manager and the board if necessary, to take actions about the threats. To 
assess those risks is not always easy and for that it exists many methodologies and approaches.  
 
Qualitative approach 
The qualitative approach consists in a series of interviews and meetings. It will result in a list 
of descriptions and recommendations for each risk. The advantages of this approach are: 
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1. Much easier to implement. 
2. Faster. 
3. Does not need a lot of input to be conducted. 
On the other side, the disadvantages are: 
1. The results are approximate. 
2. We do not have concrete numbers. 
This approach is perfect for projects or organisations with limited resources or with tight 
schedule.[18] 
 
Quantitative approach 
The quantitative approach will be much more accurate by associating numbers to the probability 
and to the damages/benefit results. The disadvantages of this approach are: 
1. In order to have an accurate value we need a lot of inputs from the project and the 
context.  
2. To implement this approach, it is expensive and time consuming. 
3. Specialists are most of the time needed 
 
Strategies for the threat 
The threat are the events that will result if they happened into a negative effect. 
Avoid 
This strategy consists into taking the necessary measures to completely avoid the risk. For 
example, the menace is: it is impossible to prove that a sub-contractor is GDPR compliant. The 
response could be breaking the contract with the contractor and implement an in-house solution. 
Transfer 
This strategy consists into giving the responsibility and accountability to a third party. For 
example, by taking an insurance. 
Diminish 
This strategy consists into acting to diminish the probability or the consequences of the event. 
For example, by creating first a mock-up to show the client and to confirm that the requirements 
were correctly understood. 
 
Strategies for the opportunities 
The opportunities are the events that will result if they happened into a positive effect. 
Exploit 
This strategy will try to reduce the factors that could avoid these events to happen. For example, 
another client could need a similar solution. So, the solution could be more generic to satisfy 
several clients. 
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Share 
For example, to share a performant process with another unit within the company. 
Enhance 
Try to raise the probability that this event happens. 
 
Strategies for both 
• Accept the risks and do nothing to mitigate them. 
• Conditional response 
 
Threat modelling 
When we read the literature about risk management there is another method which is very 
popular, the threat modelling. If we take the definition from the Open Web Application Security 
Project “Threat modelling works to identify, communicate, and understand threats and 
mitigations within the context of protecting something of value”. The threat modelling will help 
to assess the applications and identify the threats. Again, it is recommended to do this from the 
beginning of the project. 
Security threat 
We can define a security threat as a vulnerability that an attacker could use to cause harm to an 
application. When this happens, it is called an attack. And to avoid these attacks it will be 
necessary to implement counter measures. In a system it is not enough to implement a counter 
measure only for a very specific part of the system, it is important to consider the context, the 
dependencies, the purpose of the module etc. There is no point in implementing huge login 
security on your application web interface if your database is accessible from outside and with 
a simple password. In the end, the security of your entire application will be as strong as the 
weakest point. Threat modelling allows to take the appropriate counter measures. It is very 
important to include this process in the software development life cycle (SDLC)[12]. This will 
help to:  
• define the security requirements 
• have a secure design 
• prioritize the threat 
• have a secure release 
Threat modelling approaches 
According to the literature as in [9], there are three different approaches for threat modelling. 
Software-centric 
One of the most important part in a software is of course the source code. When you develop 
an application for a client, there is not always information about the deployment environment, 
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sometime for security reason. With the software-centric approach it is possible to focus on the 
software itself, his different components and detect where the software itself can be attacked. 
To be able to do that it is very important to have a deep understanding of the application model. 
And since we are in the development phase, every stakeholders of the project need to understand 
it. So, a good communication plan is critical. Once everyone is up to date in the understanding 
of the model, we will have a security improvement in the different components of the software. 
The software-centric approach of threat modelling will allow the developers to participate to 
the threat modelling and to have a better business understanding which will make them more 
efficient. Also, the detected threat will be known and shared to everyone.[9][10]  
Asset-centric 
With this approach the focus and the main interest are on the infrastructure of the application 
or what the company owns. Like in the risk management we call that asset. So, this approach 
will be used when a good needs to be protected, for example data subject personal data that 
have been collected with a legal purpose. As opposed to the software-centric approach here 
there is a need to know the context in which the software will be deployed. If there are processes 
that allow to access the asset, they must be communicated and understood.[9] 
Today we have a lot of tools that allow to increase the security on the assets. For example, the 
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) provides a list of existing attacks and the 
action plan that could be put in place to mitigate them for the web application. They defined 
this as an awareness document that regroups the most critical security risks. To create this 
document, they took advantage of the experience from security experts who shared their 
expertise. 
Attacker-centric 
Another way to see the system vulnerabilities is of course from an attacker point of view. For 
that, all the access points of the application need to be identified. When we looked at attacker-
centric models we can see that they list all the threats and present them as attack trees. Each 
tree represents an attack on system. We have the goals as roots, and the leaves represent the 
ways to achieve that goal, this is recursive, each root sub node is a sub goal etc. We can also 
have OR nodes to represent the different possibilities or AND nodes if all the steps are required 
to reach the goal. You can see the example of one tree representation in figure 2.[9][10] 
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Figure 2: Example of an attack tree. Reproduced from ThreadModel-AttackTree[14] 
 
When the tree is built, we can associate attributes to each node and give a value for each of 
them. These values will allow us to evaluate the security of the goal. The figure 3 shows an 
example of the attributes and their values.[14] 
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Figure 3 example of node attributes. Reproduced from ThreadModel-AttackTree[14] 
 
This example of evaluation shows us how threat could be prioritized and what we could sort 
them by (damage cost – cost of attack), if the attacks cost more than the profit, it will probably 
not occur, otherwise these vulnerabilities need to be secured.  These attributes help to associate 
risks with an attack. Of course, we could add many different attributes, knowledge or time 
required, cost of development… [14] 
Threat modelling point of view 
There are two points of view we can use to do threat modelling: 
1. Defender point of view 
This one requires less technical knowledge and is easier to implement. One needs to 
know the infrastructure on this, one detects the vulnerabilities. 
2. Attacker point of view 
This one is a little bit trickier. The attacker does not necessarily know the architecture, 
he will modelize the system as a succession of layers and for each of these layers list 
the attacks he could use to access the system. 
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Chapter 3: Analysis of risk management 
methodologies 
Like it was said in the introduction, today there are plenty of solutions or methodologies to 
implement the risk management. In this chapter we are going to select the most relevant ones 
for our subject. For that we will use several criteria: 
• The method can be used on new and existing information systems 
• There is enough online documentation 
• The method is known and used by the community and already has convincing results 
• The output allows to create a risk plan like described in fig.1 
• It focuses on projects rather than organisations 
First a list of methodology has been created by browsing the literature like [14][15]. Here is an 
exhaustive list table with all the methodologies founded. 
 
Name Selected 
Austrian IT Security Handbook No 
Cramm - 
Cobit No 
Ducth A&K Analysis No 
Ebios Yes 
Fair Yes 
Frap Yes 
Isam No 
ISF Method No 
ISO/IEC 13335-2 No 
ISO/IEC 17799 No 
ISO/IEC 27001 No 
IR-Grundschutz - 
Magerit - 
Marion No 
Mehari - 
Migra - 
Octave Yes 
Rfm - 
RiskSafe  - 
SP800-30 - 
Tara - 
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Excluded methodologies 
• Austrian IT Security Handbook: The available documentation for the Austrian IT 
Security Handbook is very limited. 
• Cobit: Is not focused enough on project but is more on IT governance. 
• Ducth A&K Analysis: Very poor online documentation. 
• Isam: Very poor online documentation. 
• ISF Method: Very poor online documentation. 
• ISO/IEC 13335-2: This is a standard to comply. 
• ISO/IEC 17799: This is a standard to comply. 
• ISO/IEC 27001: This is a standard to comply. 
• Marion : Very poor online documentation. 
• Migra: Very poor online documentation. 
 
Selected methodologies 
The purpose of this thesis is to give information on tools available to do risk management and 
to compare them to the threat modelling approaches. The analysis of all methodologies is out 
of scope. Three methodologies will be selected by using the selection criteria defined above. 
Here is the list of the selected methodologies: 
• EBIOS: This methodology is wildly used and partly used in other tailored 
methodologies for data privacy impact assessment for example. 
• FAIR: Simpler and quantitative approach. 
• OCTAVE: Octave is one of the most named methodology in the literature. 
• FRAP: A more visual risk assessment methodology. 
The goal of this selection is to have the most different risk assessment approaches as possible. 
Of course, the criteria popularity is also important here since the goal is to inform. For the 
analysis of the selected methodologies the following structure will be used 
• Origins: explain where, how, the methodology has been created 
• Purpose:  the goal of the methodology. 
• Process: all the process defined in the methodology. 
• Reflexion: A first analysis of the methodology, the advantages and disadvantages. 
The methodologies with a ‘-‘ could have been chosen but It was not possible to study them all 
so choice had to be made. 
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Comparison criteria 
To compare these methodologies, we will use the following criteria: 
 
 
Time for implementation scale 
The following scale will be used in order to express the appreciation of the time needed 
 
Level of scale Scale description 
Fast Not many steps, straight to the point.   
Normal Requires organisation. 
Long Long process that requires a lot of analysis and implementation time 
 
Necessary skills (complexity) 
The following scale will be used in order to express the experience needed to implement the 
methodology due to its complexity 
 
Level of scale Scale description 
None Anyone can do it 
Normal A previous experience in risk assessment or project management is needed 
Advanced A strong experience in risk management is needed 
 
comparison criteria Definitions 
Time for implementation 
By reading the documentation, an appreciation is given on the time 
needed to implement the solution. This is deduced by the number 
of steps required by the methodology and their level of details.  
Necessary skills 
(complexity) 
By analysing the methodology, an appreciation is given on the 
complexity of this one. If the complexity is high, a more 
experienced profile will be needed to use the methodology. 
Results readability 
This criterion will determine if the produced result is easily 
understandable and usable. 
Scope 
This criterion will assess if all the risks are considered for the 
studied solution. 
19 
 
Result readability scale 
 
The following scale will be used in order to assess the result of the implementation, if it easily 
usable or not. 
Profile Profile description 
Easy Results are user friendly and understandable by all. 
comprehensible The results require attentive reading to be understand 
complex The data are there but not easy to understand. 
 
Scope scale 
 
The following scale will be used in order to assess the scope covered by the methodology. 
Profile Profile description 
Low Many risks or threats are not covered. 
Complete The results are correct 
Detailed The results are extensive and consider all the aspects.  
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EBIOS  
Origins 
The EBIOS (Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité) methodology 
was created in 1995 by the ANSSI (Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes 
d’Information). EBIOS is an experienced methodology that has more than 20 years of 
experience.[17] 
Purpose 
EBIOS allows to assess the risks and to identify the counter measures to mitigate them. This 
method also allows to validate the level of acceptable risks and to improve the security of the 
information system on the long term. This methodology will bring a better communication and 
will allow the management to make decisions with the arguments provided by the methodology.  
This methodology can be used for several purposes: 
1. To put in place an entire risk management process within an organisation. 
2. To assess and manage the risks.  
3. To define for each good the level of security that needs to be reached by considering the 
context and the scope of the study. 
According to EBIOS, this methodology is fit for all organisations, small, big, private sector or 
public sector. The methodology could be used on a green field project or an existing one.[19] 
Process 
The EBIOS methodology has a top down approach. First, it will do a high-level analysis and 
then it will focus more and more on the business elements by studying the possible attack on 
them. The goal is to create a list of scenarios for possible attacks on business elements. In order 
to realise that, the methodology is articulated around 5 modules. 
• Context and scope 
• Sources 
• Strategic scenario 
• Operational scenario 
• Mitigation plan 
These modules are executed in cycles. There are two kinds of cycles. (See figure 4) 
1. Strategic cycle 
- This cycle will reassess the entire study, especially the strategic scenarios. 
2. Operational cycle 
- This cycle will focus on the operational scenarios when a new security breach 
occurs, or new vulnerabilities are detected. [19] 
 
21 
 
 
Figure 4: EBIOS steps source [guide-methode-ebios-risk-manager] 
The five modules 
Like we said before the methodology consists of five modules. For each of them, we will: 
• Detail the objectives 
• Identify the contributors 
• Define the steps and how to proceed 
• Define the produced outputs 
Context and scope 
The objectives 
This first step is there to analyse and define the context of the project, the scope which must be 
covered by the study, the stakeholders, the time table. An analysis on the goods will be done to 
list them and determine the dreaded events and their impacts. During this step the required 
security level will be defined. 
The contributors 
This step is done in the strategic cycle which means that the management must be involved 
since decisions over the risk strategy must be made. The recommended profiles required for 
this step are: 
• Direction 
• Operational manager: the different profiles responsible for the concerned business 
• The CISO, Chief Information Security Officer who will provide or approve strategic 
security decisions. 
• The information system director: his input is necessary since it could concern several 
and sometimes all the information systems of the organisation. 
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The steps and how to proceed 
The methodology requires 4 steps to be done during workshops or analysis: 
1. To define the case study 
In order to do so, the methodology offers to first explain the subject and the requirements 
of the meeting. It is very important that everyone understands, agrees on the 
requirements and the subject of the study. Once they are set, it is not always easy to 
change them since it would require a new strategic cycle. An example of study could be 
the management of the privacy management of the process on the personal data. This 
subject will determine the level of details required by the study. 
During this module, the required people and skills will be identified and associated to 
the different workshops. 
The recurrence of the cycle must be defined. To be defined, they must take into account 
the context, the goal of the study… 
And of course, the planning that is required by the project manager will be drafted. 
 
2. To define the scope of the study 
To do that the methodology offers to analyse the object of the study. What are the 
processed used, why, what are the related goods or process that the object needs to be 
able to work… the documentation provides a nice table as example that could be used 
(see figure 5). The goal here is not to be exhaustive but only to have a list. It allows to 
easily change the table if necessary. 
 
3. To identify the dread events and assess them 
In this step, the dread event needs to be identified and assessed. With EBIOS each dread 
event needs to be linked to the affected good. It allows the stakeholders to be aware of 
the security issues and their consequences. In order to do that, the table filled in the 
previous step can be used and for each element we will list the threats. 
 
4. To put in place the required security level 
To put that in place you need to refer to a model. It could be ISO specification, special 
regulation, internal guidelines… For the study object, we need to do an assessment of 
the compliance regarding these references. 
To define the produced outputs 
This first module will produce the following outputs  
• A case study 
• The necessary stakeholders for the different steps 
• The list of different processes and goods of the study 
• The references with the flexibility 
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Figure 5 source [guide-methode-ebios-risk-manager fiche 1] 
Sources 
The objectives 
The goal of this module is to identify the sources of the risks and their target. Once they are 
identified they will be analysed and assess. Only the selected risks will be used to create the 
scenario in the next modules. 
The contributors 
This module is still in the strategic cycle, so the management still needs to be involved. The 
recommended profiles required for this step are: 
• The direction: for strategic decisions 
• The Operational manager: to confirm the sources and the damages. It can also raise their 
awareness 
• The CISO: he brings his expertise for sources of risk 
• A security expert can be required if the skills of the team are not sufficient. 
 
The steps and how to proceed 
This module is relatively short, but to be able to correctly identify the steps, it requires a certain 
knowledge like whom could the menace come from, why would they attack, how.... This 
module requires several steps: 
1. To identify the sources of the risks and their target 
A list of all the sources risks and their goals must be done. For that the methodology 
provides a table with all the existing threat sources. 
2. To analyse and assess 
Once the first step is done, an assessment must be conducted. In order to do that, matrix 
must be used in order to prioritize the risks. 
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3. To select the relevant one 
Here the decisions are made to select the risks that are considered as non-acceptable. 
 
The produced outputs  
This module will produce the following outputs:  
• list of coupled sources/goals 
• table of assessment 
 
Strategic scenarios 
The objectives 
This step will allow to have a better vision of the information system and all its threats. This 
will allow to create high level scenarios called “strategic scenarios”. They represent the path 
that a threat can take to attack the system. When this step is done a security measure of the 
information system is already possible. 
The contributors 
With this module we are not in the strategic cycle anymore, so the decision management is not 
required anymore. The recommended profiles required for this step are: 
• Operational manager 
• Functional architect 
• CISO 
• A security expert if the knowledge of the team is not enough. 
The steps and how to proceed 
This module requires to: 
1. Select the critical stakeholders and list the linked threat that are in the context of the 
studied object. 
2. Produce strategical scenarios. 
3. Define security measures for the strategical scenarios that could happen 
The produced outputs  
This module will produce the following outputs: 
• List of threats in the context of the studied object. 
• List of strategical scenarios 
• Relevant security measures 
  
Operational scenarios 
The objectives  
In this step, more detailed scenarios are built. These scenarios will define the exact way the 
threat source can use to realise the strategic scenarios. This Step is organised in the same way 
as the previous one but will focus on the support goods. 
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The contributors 
The recommended profiles required for this step are: 
• The CISO 
• The information system director 
• A security expert if the knowledge of the team is not enough. 
The steps and how to proceed 
In order to create the operational scenario, you need to use the strategic scenarios defined in the 
previous module and try to identify the support goods that could be used to implement those 
strategic scenarios. To help you with this task you could use models that list the existing attacks 
on specific goods. Once this is done you can represent your scenario as an attack three for 
example. 
The produced outputs 
This module will produce the following output: 
• A list of the operational scenarios 
Mitigation plan 
The objectives 
In this last step, a recap of all the analysed risks will be done to allow the creation of a risk plan. 
In this document, we will describe the necessary security measures and a proper way to monitor 
them. 
The contributors 
The recommended profiles required for this step are: 
• The management: to acknowledge on the result of the cycle. 
• The CISO 
The steps and how to proceed 
This final module will use the 4 previous modules to create a synthesis. In order to complete 
this module, you need to: 
1. Represent the identified risks 
In order to represent the identified risks, you could use a graph which represents the 
likelihood and the severity and dispose the risk on it. This way, the management will 
clearly identify the most dangerous ones. 
2. Decide the strategy for the identified risks 
Mitigate, control, accept. 
3. Assess and document the residual risks 
4. Define a plan to follow the risks 
The produced outputs 
• This final module produces the following necessary documents for the management 
• the mitigation plan 
• the residual risks 
• the plan to enhance the overall security 
• the plan to follow the risks 
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Synthesis 
What we conclude with this methodology:  
• This methodology could be used for all kinds of environments, small or big 
organizations. 
• The granularity of the study can be customized. 
• The methodology provides a lot of tools to help during the implementation. 
• The methodology is modular and has an agile approach. 
• The documentation can be sometimes confusing, it is not always easy to see the link 
between the steps. 
• The full implementation is quite fastidious. 
• An expert is required if the security knowledge is not enough in the organization. 
The overall impression of this methodology is that only big companies will think or have the 
need to implement it, even if the documentation says that it is fit for small organisation as well. 
Moreover, the number of contributors is high and going through all the hierarchy can be quite 
difficult sometimes. We also clearly see in the following tables that the produced outputs are 
most of the time for the management which means that the knowledge remains at their level 
and they need to have a communication plan to raise the awareness with the rest of the 
stakeholders.  
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Steps 
Output Contributors Target 
users 
Complementary 
methodology, 
technique 
Context 
and scope 
-case study 
-stakeholders 
necessary for the 
different steps. 
-list of different 
process and 
good of the 
study 
-The references 
with the 
flexibility 
-management 
-expert 
 
management Data flow diagram 
Sources -list of coupled 
sources/goal 
-table of 
assessment 
-management 
-expert 
 
management  
Strategic 
scenario 
-list of threat in 
the context of 
the studied 
object. 
-list of 
strategical 
scenarios 
-relevant 
security 
measures 
-Operational 
manager 
-Functional 
architect 
-CISO 
 
-Architect 
-CISO 
Elevation of 
privileged 
Operational 
scenario 
-list of the 
operational 
scenarios 
-The CISO 
-The information 
system director 
-A security expert 
-Architect 
-CISO 
T-MAP 
Mitigation 
plan 
-the mitigation 
plan 
-the residual 
risks 
-the plan to 
enhance the 
overall security 
-the plan to 
follow the risks 
-management 
-CISO 
-operational 
manager 
management 
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Criteria 
Time to implement: Long 
 Justifications 
• It requires the involvement of the hierarchy 
• The methodology is not always easy to understand 
• There are a lot of documents to produce 
• The execution of all modules is fastidious 
Level of skill: Advanced 
 Justifications 
• It requires having a good organisation and management experience. 
• The methodology is not always easy to understand. 
• The target user is most of the time the management. 
Readability: comprehensible (The produced documents can be long)  
 Justifications 
• If the representation is chosen correctly, the management will not have 
difficulties to understand. E.g. use a matrix to represent the risks. 
• The number of created tables can be confusing and the link between them 
is not always clear 
Scope: Detailed 
 Justifications 
• This detailed appreciation requires that the methodology is correctly 
implemented, that the necessary skills and knowledge are available and the 
cooperation of all the stakeholders. 
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FAIR  
Origins 
FAIR (Factor Analysis for Information Risks) is a risk management framework developed by 
Jack A. Jones in 2001. It has been adopted by The Open Group as a standard. [21] 
Purpose 
The core of the FAIR framework is to quantify the risks in an organisation. For this 
methodology, if it is not possible to measure the risks, then it is not possible to make decisions. 
This framework will provide a way to effectively quantify the risks and then manage them.[33] 
The approach of this methodology is to have a quantitative evaluation of the risks. It will try to 
answer to these main questions: 
- “How much risk do we have?  
-  How much risk is associated with…?  
-  How much less (or more) risk will we have if…?  
-  Which of our risk management options are likely to be most cost-effective?  
-  What benefit are we getting for our current risk management expenditures?”  
(Measuring and Managing Information Risk (A Fair Approach), Jack Freund and Jack Jones, 
2015 Introduction) 
Process 
The FAIR framework is composed of two main elements (figure 6): 
1. Risk 
This first element is composed of a combination of threats controls assets impact that 
could lead to a loss. The controls are the means which are put in place in order to monitor 
the assets of the organisation (firewall, passwords complexity, backup for the 
integrity…) 
 
2. Risk management 
In this element we can see 2 main roles groups: 
 
• The decisions: This is the role of the management. They will draft processes, 
choose technologies, define policies in order to define the risks goals. 
 
• The execution: To apply the guide lines drafted by the decision management, 
there is a need for an execution role. And of course, to execute correctly and 
make the good decisions that respect the guidelines established by the 
decision management, a good communication, support and enforcement 
must be provided as well. This is essential because without support, for 
example, a head of unit could be powerless. Of this depend the awareness 
(of the policies…), the capability to execute correctly and their motivation.  
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Figure 6: FAIR risk management system[21] 
In order to have a proper risk management system, there is obviously a need for loop to repeat 
the cycle. (figure 7). The loop is represented by feedbacks coming from the different roles, 
capabilities and elements. Like we saw previously, the FAIR framework believes in a quantified 
approach, so it is necessary to add matrix to these feedbacks that will help the decision groups 
to correctly assess.  
 
Figure 7: complete FAIR risk management system 
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Risk analysis 
With the FAIR framework it happens sometimes that the same scenario is assessed several 
times, one for each point of view. This will allow to bring the most relevant scenario to the top. 
The process flow for the risk analysis is the following (fig 8) 
 
Figure 8: risk analysis flow [31] 
Scenario building 
The objectives  
In this step, the scenarios and their scope will be defined. The goal is to structure the thought 
of the participants. 
The contributors 
The contributors can be the execution roles, the operational roles, the developers, anyone who 
could have an idea, a question, or a suggestion on the organisation assets. 
The steps and how to proceed 
The methodology insists in compartmentalizing the scenarios in four factors: 
• Assets at risk  
In most of the scenarios, multiple assets are involved, personal computers stolen, 
password displayed on stickers on the desk, a database.  
• Threat community  
Here we are going to list who or what is the threat source. 
• Threat type  
Here we will determine the nature of the threat. Is it a malicious human? Is it Mother 
Nature? Is it a human error? All these factors will have an influence on the impact. 
• Effect 
Here we need to assess the effect on the asset itself. The framework advices to use the 
CIA framework. 
The framework does not provide tools or template in order to that but tries to help by giving 
examples of questions that should be asked or by providing another framework that could 
be useful. 
The produced outputs 
• A table that contains, for each scenario, all the assets affected, by who or what, the threat 
type and the effect on the asset. 
 
FAIR factors 
The objectives 
In this step, we will perform a further comprehension of the scenario by analysing the outputs 
of the previous step. 
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The contributors 
The contributors can be the execution roles, the operational roles, the developers, anyone who 
could have an idea, a question, or a suggestion on the assets of the organisation. 
The steps and how to proceed 
In order to do this evaluation, we will use the documents from the scenario building 
• The analysed asset and his environment will help to understand the control that are in 
place and why they are not sufficient. It will also help to analyse by whom or what it 
can be attacked. 
• The threat community will also help to determine the capability of the threat and the 
frequency at which it can attack. 
• The threat type will also help to assess the frequency and the loss. For example, 
unintentional events occur more than a malicious attack. 
• The effect associated with the asset will also give information on the frequency. 
The produced outputs 
There are none. This step only brings knowledge and a better comprehension of the scenario 
and will help for the next steps. 
Expert estimation and PERT 
The objectives 
In this step an estimation will be performed. To do so, the framework provides measurement 
techniques like calibrated PERT. 
The contributors 
• The contributors can be the execution roles, the operational roles, the developers, 
anyone who could have an idea, a question, or a suggestion on the assets of the 
organisation. 
• experts 
The steps and how to proceed 
Like we said previously, techniques like PERT will be used. You can see in figure 10 an 
example of quantified threats. These data will be used in the next step as well as the data from 
the figure 9 that represents the quantification if the risk occurs. 
 
Figure 9: Loss for the risks [21] 
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Figure 10: quantified threats [21] 
The produced outputs 
• Estimation analysis 
• Documentations on the scope and the reasoning for these results. 
Monte Carlo engine 
The objectives 
Now that all the data have been created, we are going to use a tool provided by the framework 
in order to process them and provide a modelling view. 
The contributors 
• Monte Carlo engine 
The steps and how to proceed 
Give the previous inputs to the modelling tool. 
The produced outputs 
The report that the decision management will use. The interpretation of these results is not in 
the scope of this framework. There is an entire chapter dedicated to that in the documentation 
that explain each graph created. 
Quasi quantitative analysis 
The objectives 
The framework also provides another possibility to analyse the risks. We are going to briefly 
describe it since it is not the primary way. Indeed, like we said before FAIR recommends to 
have a fully quantitative risk analysis. 
The contributors 
• Expert in FAIR concept and method 
• Any member of the organisation 
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The steps and how to proceed 
This basic FAIR analysis is composed of 11 steps within 4 stages 
- Stage 1 To identify scenario components  
 
o 1) To identify the assets at risk: all the assets that are concerned are listed. 
o 2) To identify the threat community under consideration (Human, malware…): Here all 
the different threat community will be listed and documented. 
 
 
Figure 11 
 
- Stage 2 To evaluate Loss Event Frequency (LEF)  
 
o 3) To estimate the probable TEF: The threat event frequency is estimated.  
o 4) Estimate T-Cap: Here we estimate the threat capability to see if the threat can come 
from isolated individuals or on the contrary lambda people. 
 
 
Figure 12: Estimate TCAP 
 
 
o 5) Estimate difficulty: we do an estimation of the difficulty to accomplish the threat.  
o 6) Derive vulnerability: Here we will create a matrix difficulty/T-Cap that will allow us 
to visualise the vulnerability. 
o 7) Derive Secondary Loss Event Frequency (SLEF) : Now we will create a matrix threat 
event frequency/vulnerability, that will allow to visualise the loss event frequency. 
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Figure 13 
 
- Stage 3 To evaluate LM  
 
o 8) To estimate Probable Loss Magnitude (PLM): This will allow the management to 
determine whether or not the responses are sufficient to cover the losses.  
 
 
Figure 14 
o 9) To estimate SLM : this is the Secondary Lost of Magnitude, it is the same output 
than the previous point but for the secondary loss. 
 
- Stage 4 To derive and articulate risk  
 
o 10) To derive and articulate primary and secondary risk: Here we create a matrix loss 
magnitude/loss event frequency that will give the risk. 
o 11) To derive and articulate overall risk reflexion: and finally, we create a 
risk/secondary risk matrix to have an overall risk view. 
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Figure 15 : overall risk 
The produced outputs 
• Modelling and tables that will allow the management to make decisions. 
 
Synthesis 
The interesting things about this methodology: 
• It brings a quantitative approach. This is something more objective for the management. 
This can help them to make better decisions for the organisation.  
• All the involved organisations, the execution, the application of the guidelines depend 
on the management support. 
• The book of knowledge is heavy to read  
• Not enough tool or template provided to help implement the methodology 
• A certification is required to correctly implement this methodology.  
• Like we can see in the following table it is possible to use other techniques to help us 
for some of the steps during the risk analysis. 
Like EBIOS, this methodology seems oversized for smaller companies, especially when you 
see the complexity and the time it takes to understand and analyse it. Again, the risk 
management methodology is clearly done for the management, but we can see that there is an 
execution role that will ensure that the decisions are applied. I did not find this element in 
EBIOS for example. If the execution roles have the motivation and the tools, we could imagine 
workshop to raise the awareness of the developers on the data privacy for example. And if it is 
not working, the framework allows to send feedbacks to the decision management. 
 
 
 
37 
 
 
Block Outputs Contributors Target users Complementary 
methodology, 
technique 
Decisions -policy 
document 
-process 
definition 
-technology 
authorised 
-management -company  
Execution -feedback on his 
capabilities 
-execution roles -management 
 
 
Risks -feedback on the 
risks 
-operational 
roles 
-management  
Scenario 
building 
 
- affected 
affected, by who 
or what, the 
threat type and 
the effect on the 
asset. 
Any members of 
the organisation 
-management -use an attack 
tree 
-CIA 
framework 
FAIR factors 
 
None Any members of 
the organisation 
-management -DFD 
-stride 
-LINDDUN 
(depends the on 
context of the 
scenario) 
Expert 
estimation and 
PERT 
 
-raw estimation 
and data  
-Any members 
of the 
organisation 
-expert 
-management  
Monte Carlo 
engine 
 
-report with all 
the risk 
quantitative 
analysis  
-compilation by 
a tool 
-management  
 
 
  
38 
 
Criteria 
Time to implement: Long 
 Justifications 
- The book of knowledge is long and not easy to read / understand 
- The missing tools or template make the workshop long to implement 
- All the hierarchy must be involved 
Level of skill: Advance 
 Justifications 
- The book of knowledge is long and not easy to read / understand 
- A certification is required to be able to correctly implement it 
Readability: comprehensible 
 Justifications 
- The modelling produced by the tool help to have a nice overview 
- The quantitative approach makes it more concrete 
Scope: Detailed  
Justifications 
- This methodology allows to go deep in the details. 
- Focus on the assets of the organisation 
- Take into account the context 
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OCTAVE 
Origins 
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) was released in 
1999 by the Software Engineering Institute. It has been requested by the department of defence. 
The last update was in 2007[23] 
 
Purpose 
Octave will allow a company to compare the cost of the vulnerabilities discovered with the cost 
of the implementation of mitigation plans. In order to do that it will use a catalogue of good 
practices, templates, workshops to gather a maximum information. With this methodology we 
can implement mitigation plan without waiting for the decision of the management by using 
existing guidelines of the organisation for example. This methodology is conducted by a 
dedicated team within the organisation to ensure that all the stakeholders in the organisation 
could be part of the process. This methodology strongly suggests that the assessment is done 
by internal stakeholders. Conducting an assessment by a third-party company could lead to 
misevaluate an asset and could lead to unnecessary mitigation plan.  
Contrary to the two first analysed methodologies, OCTAVE is not a continuous process. It has 
a beginning and an end. So, it is important to set some markers on signals that will relaunch this 
assessment work (change in law, new data privacy regulation, etc.). 
l
 
• Figure 16: Octave source [CERT  http://www.cert.org/octave/, 2008.] 
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The outputs of this methodology are intended for the management that must deal with the risks. 
OCTAVE framework is optimized for medium and big companies (more than 100 people for 
OCTAVE-S). [24] OCTAVE has 3 declinations: 
• OCTAVE: This is the original one. (last 2001) 
• OCTAVE-S: This modified version is adapted to smaller organisations (2005) 
• OCTAVE Allegro: This approach is straighter forward, and it will focus on 
information asset. (2007) 
 
Process 
In the context of this analysis, we will focus on OCTAVE Allegro. This methodology approach 
is more asset centric and is composed of 4 phases and 8 processes. The goal of this method is 
to provide a good risk assessment analysis without being an expert in risk assessment. It is very 
important to successfully implement the OCTAVE method to use and to understand the 
suggested worksheet of the methodology. 
 
Figure 17: Octave Allegro processes 
Establish Driver 
The objectives 
In this phase, we are going to decide what the risk criteria are and how to evaluate them. Of 
course, the result of this phase will be different for each organisation and assessment since the 
context is always different. 
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The contributors 
The contributors will be the dedicated team which should be composed of internal stakeholders 
and possibly external experts. (It could be one person) 
The steps and how to proceed 
For this phase there is only one step which is: 
• To establish risk measurement criteria  
In this step, the methodology requires all the sectors and assets where the organisation 
could be impacted to be listed. Once this is done, measurement criteria must be decided 
to evaluate the effect that a risk could have on it. In this methodology, the criteria will 
be qualitative, and they will reflect the organisation view.  
In addition, the processes or assets that are more critical than other if attacked, should 
also be identified. This will allow to set a prioritisation in the assets. 
To help with this step, the methodology provides worksheet templates to create the criteria on 
the identified areas and prioritise them. 
The produced outputs 
• A list of defined criteria’s for the different assets, areas and their prioritisation. 
Asset profile 
The objectives 
Like we said before, the methodology is asset focused.  In this step, we will focus on those 
assets and create a profile. A profile will be composed of: 
• The features 
• The qualities 
• The characteristics 
• The value 
If the methodology is correctly followed, the assets will be correctly described, the scope of 
each asset will also be correctly defined as well as the security requirements. 
The contributors 
The contributors are the dedicated team that should be composed of internal stakeholders and 
possibly external experts. (It could be one person) 
The steps and how to proceed 
This phase is composed of 2 steps: 
• To develop an information assets profile  
Information asset is very important in the OCTAVE methodology. It is a definition of 
all the organisation goods that have value. In this step, they will be listed and 
documented. Each asset will have its own sheet that will be used later for the threats 
identification. 
• To identify information assets containers  
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All the information assets that have been listed in the previous step must be stocked 
somehow. In this step, information on the storage means it will be collected (hardware, 
databases, paper, etc.) In order to do that the team will map each asset with all the 
containers it depends on. Those containers englobe all the places where the assets are 
processed. 
The produced outputs 
• A list of all the containers where the data is processed. 
• A mapping between the data and those containers. 
Identity threats 
The objectives 
The goal of this phase is to detect the threats on the identified assets in their environment. Once 
these threats are detected, they are properly documented. 
The contributors 
The contributors are the dedicated team that should be composed of internal stakeholders and 
possibly external experts. (It could be one person) 
The steps and how to proceed 
 
• To identify areas of concern  
In this step, we will start with the proper risk identification. Scenarios that could lead to 
a data breach will be detected through brainstorming. The goal of this step is not to have 
a full list of threat scenarios for each asset but it is more about to quickly capture the 
first areas of concern that pops in the mind of the team. 
 
• To identify threat scenarios  
Here, we are going to use the areas of concern from the previous step and create with 
them threat scenarios. They will bring more details to the threats. The problem is that if 
we only use the team knowledge to detect threat we risk missing some. In order to avoid 
that, in the second part of this step, we will use threat tree to identify remaining threats. 
This step will be also used to add the probability in the documentation of the threat. 
However, at this step, it is not easy to exactly quantify the probability. So the 
methodology requires to use the following assessment: low medium high.  
The produced outputs 
• A list of documented threats with their probability 
To identify and mitigate 
The objectives 
During this phase, the identification of the risks and the mitigation plan will be put in place by 
using the identified threats. 
The contributors 
The contributors are the dedicated team that should be composed of internal stakeholders and 
possibly external experts. (It could be one person). 
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The steps and how to proceed 
This phase is composed of 3 steps: 
• To identify the risks  
Here, for each identified threat and their identified consequences, the impacts if the 
threat happens is analysed, all the impacted points in the organisation are assessed. This 
will result in a list of the corresponding consequences for each threat. 
• To analyse the risks  
Here the impacts if the risks occurred will be quantitatively measured. Each of them 
will receive a value. To give this value the different impacted point, their consequences 
and the probability that it happens will be used. This is different for each organisation 
because they all have different assets importance (reputation, data, etc.). Now that we 
have that, the management should be able to make decisions on which risk to mitigate 
or to accept. OCTAVE provides a method to quantify the risks. If an organisation 
correctly prioritises the impact criteria’s, it will allow the risks to be treated according 
to these priorities.  
• To select a mitigation approach  
Finally the risk plan is defined. Most of the time, a grid is defined with different zones. 
The risks are displayed on that grid and depending on their zone, they are mitigated, 
deferred or accepted. [23] 
The produced outputs 
• A list of the corresponding consequences for each threat 
• A list of the identified risks and their quantification 
• A list of the mitigation plan 
Synthesis 
By analysing this ‘famous’ methodology we can see that: 
• This assessment methodology is asset centric. 
• By tailoring a little bit the assessment methodology, we can easily detect data privacy 
threats (by using LINDDUN for example).  
• The steps of one iteration are fastidious but much clearer than EBIOS for example. 
• The tool allows the tailoring and provides many worksheets to help with the 
implementation. 
• Again, this risk management method has as target group the management. But the 
assessment team could be composed of all sort of internal stakeholders which could lead 
to a raise of the security awareness within the company. 
• This method is mostly used by big companies. 
• To be really efficient, it should rely on the business knowledge of the assessment team 
and the technical expertise of security. 
The overall impression when we analyse this methodology is that you will need someone who 
is trained at OCTAVE, to know what to do during the workshops, which sheet to use, etc. It is 
clearly stated in their documentation that they recommend a training before implementing the 
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solution. Nowadays many IT companies that provide services count less than 100 employees 
and even OCTAVE-S that is intended for what they call ‘small companies’ would not quite fit. 
  
phases Outputs Contributors Target group Complementary 
methodology, 
technique. 
Establish Driver 
 
- List of defined 
criteria for the 
different asset, 
area and their 
prioritisation. 
 
-assessment 
team 
-management -elevation of 
privilege 
Profile assets 
 
-List of all the 
container where 
the data is 
processed. 
-Mapping 
between the data 
and those 
containers. 
 
-assessment 
team 
-management -data flow 
diagram 
Identity threats 
 
- List of 
documented 
threat with heir 
probability 
 
-assessment 
team 
-management -LINDDUN(to 
detect the data 
privacy threat) 
Identify and 
mitigate 
 
-list for each 
threat the 
corresponding 
consequences 
-List of the 
identify risks 
and their 
quantification 
-List of the 
mitigation plan 
 
-assessment 
team 
-management  
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Criteria 
Time to implement: Normal 
 Justifications 
• The implementation of the eight different steps takes time but the phases are not 
complicated. 
• Workshops need to be organised to produce the necessary lists (areas of concern, threat 
scenarios, risks evaluation…) 
•  The methodology provides many tools to help and can be completed by other tools to 
help. 
Level of skill: Normal 
Justifications 
• The documentation is clear but extensive 
• It requires experience to organise so many workshops and be sure to invite the correct 
people. 
• According to the documentation, two days of training are sufficient to implement 
correctly the methodology 
 
Readability: comprehensible 
Justifications 
• The produced matrix and the prioritisation is clear 
• If needed additional arguments are available in the produced documents in the previous 
steps. 
Scope: detailed 
Justifications 
• This methodology if correctly implemented provides a detailed list on the existing risks 
of an organisation.  
• Again, business and technical knowledges are required to arrive to such appreciation 
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FRAP  
Origins 
For a long time, the risk assessment was delegated to external companies that had a lot of 
experience doing these tasks. The issue is that those analysis always take weeks and were 
expensive. Also, with this approach, the internal stakeholders were not taken into account and 
the expectations from the management were rarely met. Then of course the management was 
often reluctant to implement the recommendations and all the assessment was done for nothing. 
So, there was a need for a new methodology that considers the requirements of the management, 
the expertise of the internal stakeholders and that is much faster to deliver results. This FRAP 
(Facilitated Risk Analysis Process) methodology tends to all these new requirements. [30] 
Purpose 
FRAP will provide a method that will allow to conduct the risk assessment in-house and in 
addition it does not require an expert to conduct it. Good facilitation skills are on the opposite 
extremely important. The FRAP methodology is focused on the business needs and has an 
efficient and rigorous method to ensure that the business operations and the security risks are 
known and documented. 
Process 
Before and during the first month of use of the FRAP methodology in your organisation it is 
important to raise the awareness of the methodology to all the stakeholders. Like previous risk 
management methodologies that we analysed, if you do not have the necessary support from 
your management it will be difficult to correctly implement the methodology [30]. Usually the 
advantages that have been listed before such as the cost efficiency and the rapidity of results 
should convince the management. The methodology defines several roles: 
• The facilitator: he could be seen as a scrum master. 
• The FRAP team: which could be seen as the resources available for the project. 
(between 7-15 peoples) 
The methodology suggests 3 workshops: 
Workshop 1: The Pre-FRAP workshop 
The objectives 
This first workshop is very important. It is a short one (less than an hour). The goal will be to 
gather 5 key components that will be used for the rest of the assessment.  
The contributors 
• The business manager 
• The team leader 
• The facilitator 
The steps and how to proceed 
This meeting has no defined structure but it is required that the following points are defined: 
1. Scope statement 
It is important that the business manager and the project lead express clearly the scope 
of the study. 
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2. Visual 
A visual modelling of the assessed process needs to be created. It will be used during 
the study to show to the other participants where the scope of the process is. 
3. Nomination of the FRAP team 
The methodology says that a FRAP team should be composed of 7 to 15 peoples.  
4. Meeting structures 
This meeting leader is the business manager, so he is responsible of the organisation. 
5. Confirmation of the definitions 
It is very important to agree on the definition of the integrity, confidentiality, availability 
and all the criteria’s that are taken into account for this study. Also you have to be sure 
that the notions used by the methodology (Risk, control, impact and vulnerability) are 
well defined and understood. 
During this meeting the process of prioritisation of the threats needs to be defined. The 
methodology suggests two ways to achieve that: 
1. The team reviews all the threats without considering the existing controls. The 
advantages are that it will define what the perfect controls are and we will be able to 
show the gap between what currently exists and what should be in place. 
2. We consider the existing controls. 
The produced outputs 
• Clear organisation set documented 
• Documented agreements on the scope and the key points of the methodology 
 
Workshop 2: The FRAP workshop 
The objectives 
During this workshop the FRAP team will identify the risks, prioritise them and define a 
mitigation plan. 
The contributors 
• The owner  
• The project lead  
• The facilitator  
• The scribe  
• The team members 
The steps and how to proceed 
There are four phases for this workshop: 
1. The preliminary phase 
In order to introduce the workshop, the scope of the study will be presented to the team. 
A technical profile will introduced, the visual produced during the pre-FRAP meeting 
and then a copy of all the definition agreed on during the pre-FRAP meeting will be 
distributed to everyone. 
2. The brainstorming process 
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During this phase all the criteria’s will be analysed (integrity, confidentiality, etc.) and 
for each team, the risk, the threat, the concerned will be identified. The methodology 
provides precise process in order to realise this phase. 
3. The risks prioritisation 
In order to prioritise the risks, the team will use the definition that they received during 
the introduction. An example of definition could be: 
• High sensibility: … 
• Medium sensibility: … 
• Low sensibility: 
4. Mitigation plan for relevant risks 
The methodology provides a list of mitigation plans that allow to control the risks. When 
the FRAP team received the invitation, they also received this list. It will be used as a 
starting point to create a mitigation plan. 
The produced outputs 
• A list of the identified risks 
• The prioritisation of the risk 
• The needed controls 
 
Workshop 3: The post-FRAP workshop 
The objectives 
During this step, we finalise the reporting for the management by regrouping all the information 
received in the previous meetings. 
The contributors 
• the business manager 
• the project lead  
• the facilitator 
The steps and how to proceed 
During the meeting, the first document will be established by the facilitator. It is the cross-
reference sheet. This is the document that requires most time to be produced. Each mitigation 
plan needs to be linked with the risk that it will be control. Once this is done, the cross reference 
sheet and the mitigation plan are sent to the business manager. After reading a first time the 
document the business manager, the project lead and the facilitator meet to review the 
documents and recommend the necessary mitigation plan. 
The produced outputs 
• The cross reference sheet  
• The identification of existing mitigation plans  
• The final report 
Synthesis 
According to the documentation, this methodology is one of the most used today. After 
analysing it we can say the following: 
• The FRAP methodology is cost effective. 
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• It requires many people through the hierarchy. 
• It is fast to implement. 
• It provides very specific tools and method to use. Even the structure of the workshops 
is explained. 
• The output is for the management which will decide what to implement. 
• The methodology is easy to understand and does not require expertise, but the facilitator 
needs to have very good organisational and communication skills. 
• Not possible to associate another tool to complete the methodology  
• There is no real need to use other methodologies or tool to complete this one. 
 
This methodology relies more on the human experience of the internal stakeholders rather than 
predefine classification given by a sheet. All the actors of the organisation take part into the 
process, which allows to cover all the points of view.  
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Workshop Outputs Contributors Target Complementary 
methodology, 
technique. 
Pre-FRAP 
meeting 
-Clear 
organisation 
set 
documented 
-Documented 
agreements on 
the scope and 
the key point 
of the 
methodology 
 
-The business 
manager 
-The team leader 
-The facilitator 
 
-facilitator 
-FRAP team  
FRAP 
meeting 
-List of 
identified risks 
-Prioritisation 
of the risk 
-Controls 
needed 
 
-The owner  
-The project lead  
-The facilitator  
-The scribe  
-The team 
members 
 
 
 
Post FRAP 
meeting 
- The Cross 
Reference 
Sheet  
-Identification 
of existing 
controls 
-Final Report 
-the business 
manager 
-project lead  
-facilitator 
 
-management 
 
 
Criteria 
Time to implement: Normal 
 Justifications 
• This methodology according to the documentation could be done in 4 to 6 days. 
• There is still the availability of every contributors that could cause issue for the 
workshops 
Level of skills: Normal 
Justifications 
• Even if according to the documentation no expert skills are needed, the soft skills are 
extremely important. 
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Readability: comprehensible 
• The produced documents meet the requirement of the management 
• They are explained and reviewed during the post-meeting 
• The manager is advised on the mitigation plan to adopt 
Scope: Low 
• The study is focused on one business need at the time 
• It would require a lot of iteration to cover all the business requirements of a big 
company. 
Discussions 
After analysing those methodologies, we can already draw some points of attention that we 
could use for the comparison between risk management and assessment and the threat 
modelling approach. 
- The risk management process is performed by someone dedicated to this task. 
- It requires to acquire the knowledge of the organisation or project via 
documentation, interview, workshop… 
- The risk management is an exercise that should start at the beginning of a project 
but could be executed later to assess the state of security of the project. 
- It is always a cyclic event that should be executed by the detection of event 
(Architecture changes for example) 
- In the documentation of these risk management methods, the concept of 
management or organisation is frequently used. 
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 EBIOS FAIR OCTAVE FRAP 
 
Quantitative approach 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
Qualitative approach 
    
X 
 
Requires management 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Small company <50 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
Big company >50 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
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Chapter 4: Analysis of threat modelling 
method 
Like for the risk management, the choice of the correct threat modelling method is essential if 
one wants to detect and assess correctly the threats in his project. In this chapter, five methods 
will be described and analysed. In order to select the five methods that I will analyse, I first did 
a quick survey of the existing tools and I selected 5 tools that I found very interesting for this 
study. I selected two that have a defender point of view and one with an attacker point of view, 
one that is more cooperative and a last one that is focused on the data privacy threats. 
• DFD (Data Flow Diagram) 
The data flow diagram is one of the most important modelling. It does not actually 
represent a threat modelling technique, but this representation is very important to 
understand since many threat modelling techniques use this data flow diagram. That is 
the reason why we are going to explain it in detail. 
• Microsoft STRIDE 
STRIDE is one of the most popular threat modelling method. 
• Elevation of privilege 
It is a method based on a card game. This approach is very interesting and entertaining. 
• T-MAP: a methodology that use an attacker point of view 
• LINDDUN 
LINDDUN is a method that is based on a data flow diagram and can be realised on 
several levels. Like the OCTAVE Allegro methodology, this method focuses on data 
assets. This could be very interesting also for data privacy assessment, in order to detect 
possible data breach for example. 
 
Comparison criteria 
To be able to compare the threat modelling methods with the risk management/assessment 
methods that we previously analysed we will use the same criteria’s to evaluate them. 
• Time for implementation 
• Necessary skills(complexity) 
• Results readability 
• Scope covered 
See point comparison criteria’s from analysis of risk management methodologies for the details. 
The same structure used for the risk management analysis will be used here for the threat 
modelling analysis. 
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• Origins: explain where, how, the methodology has been created 
• Purpose:  the goal of the methodology. 
• Process: all the process defined in the methodology. 
• Reflexion: A first analysis of the methodology, the advantages and disadvantages. 
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DFD  
Origins 
DFP (Data Flow Diagrams) are used since 1970. They have been introduced by E. Yourdon 
and L. Constantine. It was a way of visualising software designs before the Uml diagrams 
arrive. 
Purpose 
This threat modelling tool is very easy to implement and is most of the time used to model the 
security relevant part of the system. One other advantage is that the diagram produced is easy 
to understand and extended. [29] The data flow diagram consists to modelized how the data are 
processed by an information system by looking at the input and the outputs. It will have a 
particular attention on the flow of information, where are they? Where are they going and how? 
Where are they stored?  
Process 
The notation 
There are two types of notations for the data flow diagrams, each of them represents differently 
the four main objects used for these diagrams which are: 
1. Data flows 
2. Processes 
3. Data stores 
4. External entities 
Like we said there is two different types of notations 
1. The one from Yourdon 
This one is more used for the system analysis and design. 
2. The from Gane & Sarson 
Their representation is more used to represent information systems. 
Let us compare the two notations and define what they mean. (see the table below to see the 
representation) 
1. Data flows 
The data flow represents the means of the information used to travel. The two notations 
are the same, if necessary, we add information about the data that is transferred. 
2. Processes 
A process will change the data flow that is considered as input into another data flow 
that will be considered as output. A process could represent an update on the data, a 
reformatting, an encryption… 
3. Data stores 
The data store represents the container that will keep the data. It could be a piece of 
paper, an external drive, a no-SQL database, etc. 
4. External entities 
The external entities are the ones that do not belong to the information system. We can 
say that the data flow that are coming and going to these external entities represent the 
inputs and the outputs of the modelized system. 
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 Yourdon’s notation. Gane & Sarson’s notation. 
Process 
  
Data flows 
 
 
Data store 
  
External 
entities 
  
 
The layers 
Data flow diagrams are composed of different layers. This will help visualizing different 
information system.  
• The context diagram 
This is the top-level diagram, it can also be considered as level 0 diagram. It always 
contains only one process which is the process 0. The process 0 will represent the 
process of the entire information system and his interaction with the external entities. 
You can see in figure 34 an example of level 0 Diagram. We can see in the middle the 
process 0 that represent the process done by the entire system, and all the external 
entities on the outside that interact with the process 0 via data flows. 
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Figure 18: Context diagram source [34] 
• The level 1 layer 
Each of the object that are in the context diagram could be define. Therefore, we have 
also a level 1 diagram that will define more in detail the data in the level 0 diagram. In 
the figure 19 we can see an example of the level 1 diagram that will detail the warehouse 
external entity that we had in the level 0 diagram. Note that the other notation could be 
used to represent object. For example, here a computer image was used to model the 
fact that the receipt are encoded into the app by a computer. 
 
 
Figure 19: Level 1 diagram source [34] 
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From there we could go into more detail by adding a new level diagram that could 
analyse the data of the Putaway external entities. We can continue this iteration as long 
as it is necessary. Of course, we have existing tools that will help us create these data 
flows and also navigate through the entity and the different levels. 
 
• Pseudocode 
At a certain point, you will reach the pseudo code representation. It is like a coding 
language, but it is meant to be read by human. 
Synthesis 
What we discovered by analysing these tools: 
• This data flow diagram is a visual modelling so it is easy to read for novice 
• The notation is simple 
• It allows to have a top down approach 
• It allows to continue the levels until the pseudo code is reached 
• The data flow diagrams do not require any expertise or experience to be used 
Like we said in the introduction this tool is not really a threat modelling tool, but it was very 
important to explain in detail how it worked since this method is used by a lot of threat 
modelling techniques. And finally, the result is not only at the destination of the manager but 
like we saw, it can be also very useful for the developers since they could go as far as the pseudo 
code to see the logic for example.  
Criteria 
Time to implement: Fast 
• There are only four notations to learn 
• There are loads of tools available to do such modelling 
Level of skill: None 
• There is no need for special training or certification 
Readability: Easy 
• It is a visual tool with only four different notations to understand 
• It is a visualisation by level, for example a manager does not need to go deep into the 
levels, but developer could! 
Scope: Low 
• If we take only iteration of the dataflow diagram the scope will resume only to the 
studied system. To have an overview of all the systems, the diagrams must be done for 
all the systems. 
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STRIDE 
Origins 
This framework has been developed by Microsoft. The word STRIDE represents the six threats 
categories: 
Spoofing: When attackers try to fake the identity of someone else.  
Tampering: When attackers try to intercept and alter the communications. 
Repudiation: When attackers succeed in preventing the discovery of the link 
between their actions and their identity. 
Information disclosure: When attackers intercept data.  
Denial of service: When attackers successfully interrupt a service.  
Elevation of privilege: When attackers succeed in gaining access right that they are 
not supposed to have. 
Purpose 
The reason Microsoft decided to use this threat modelling technique is quite simple. They 
wanted something cheaper, faster, and easier to use to detect and mitigate the risks. Like wat 
we saw in the previous chapter on the analysis of the risk management methodologies, is that 
they can be time and money consuming, they are done most of the time at the organisation level 
for the management and their results are sometimes not even considered. With the threat 
modelling Microsoft wanted to bring a tool more accessible by the project team that could be 
easily used and that will allow to have sufficiently detailed results. 
Process 
The Microsoft threat methodology is composed of four steps (see figure 20). The workflow can 
be relaunched when it is needed, for example, if an output is added to the system information 
or by adding a new way of interacting with the system. 
 
Figure 20: SRIDE workflow [35] 
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Diagrams 
The objectives 
The goal of this phase is first to define the scope of the study and to model it with a data flow 
diagram. The dataflow that is created will be used during the next steps. 
The contributors 
• The development teams 
• The project manager 
• The analyst 
The steps and how to proceed 
We will not come back on how to do a data flow diagram since it has been fully defined in the 
previous point. Nevertheless, it is important that Microsoft threat modelling added a new 
notation to this diagram that will represent boundaries. 
There are three new boundaries introduced by Microsoft (see figure 21): 
1. Trust boundary 
They will model the fact that two components do not trust each other. For example, 
there could be a trust boundary between a component that requires a login and another 
that does not. 
2. Machine boundary 
This marks the frontier between to servers or machine. 
3. Process boundary 
This will model the start or the end of a process. For example, when a command has 
been encoded and then start the preparation. 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Boundary notation 
The documentation says that most of the time a level 1 diagram is enough except in certain very 
complex system.   
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Also, during this step all the security assumption must be listed like the presence of a firewall 
or the possibility of an attack by social engineering. 
The produced outputs 
• The data flow diagrams enhanced by the boundaries 
• A list of existing security measures 
• A list of known threat. 
To identify threats 
The objectives 
The goal here is to take all the identified elements in the dataflow diagram and map them to 
threat categories. In other to that we will use the STRIDE threat categories that we defined 
before. 
The contributors 
• A security expert OR the project team helped by the attack tree that STRIDE provides. 
 
The steps and how to proceed 
There are two different ways of doing this step, it will depend on the contributors. 
1. The security experts are available 
In this case, the security experts can brainstorm together, review all the diagrams and 
map all the existing threats.  
2. No experts are available and the project team is performing the steps. 
If there are no experts available, do not panic, if you remember one of the goals of the 
Microsoft threat modelling methodology was to make the process available for the 
project team. In order to do that, they just have to follow a simple algorithm: 
“ 
For each item in Diagram DO 
 Switch item.type 
  Case(process) 
   Apply STRIDE; 
  Case(Data STORE) 
   Apply TID; 
  Case(entity) 
   Apply SR; 
  Case(data flow) 
   Apply TID; 
 End switch 
End For ” 
 
The produced outputs 
• A list of all threats categorized in the STRIDE model. 
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To mitigate 
The objectives 
The goal of this step is to define mitigation plan for the vulnerabilities. This is of course the 
most important step since it will allow give the means for the information system to be secure. 
The contributors 
• The developers 
• The project manager 
• The analyst 
The steps and how to proceed 
Again, to define a mitigation plan with STRIDE there is no need to be a security expert. 
STRIDE provides a threats list for all the mapping that was done in the previous step that should 
be taken into account. In figure 22 you can see one of the tree provides by STRIDE. 
 
Figure 22: STRIDE tree check [25] 
So the team needs to do for each mapping go through the trees and see and assess what could 
trigger a threat. For the mitigation, if you can easily put it in place, do it, if not the methodology 
advises to restrain from trying. Mitigation is the role of experts. 
The produced outputs 
• A list of risks 
• A list of advised mitigations 
Validate 
The objectives 
In this step all threats will be documented. 
The contributors 
• The project lead 
• The developer team 
• The test team 
• The quality officer 
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The steps and how to proceed 
The methodology does not provide a specific template for this step. In the community the 
misuse case is the format generally used for this phase. This step will be a check of all the 
previous ones.  
• Is the data flow diagram correct? 
• Do we have all the threats? 
• Are their correctly mapped? 
• Do we have mitigation for all the threats? 
The produced outputs 
• A document with all the threats defined. 
Synthesis 
During the analysis of this methodology we pointed that: 
• The produced output is more for the development team than for the management 
• The methodology does not require to be an expert (except for the mitigation plan) 
• This methodology can be started by the project manager 
• It involves the development team 
We can clearly feel that the purpose of this methodology is to detach the heavy workload that 
a classical risk management brings. It is much easier and faster to implement and provides tool 
that allow non experts to conduct the study. 
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 Output Contributors Target users 
Diagram 
 
-Data flow diagram 
enhances by the 
boundaries 
-List of existing 
security measures 
-List of known 
threat. 
 
-The development 
teams 
-The project 
manager 
-The analyst 
-The project team 
Identify threats -List of all threats 
categorized in the 
STRIDE model. 
 
-expert or project 
team 
-The project team 
Mitigate -List of risks 
-List of advised 
mitigations. 
 
-project team 
-expert if mitigation 
is too complex 
-the project manager 
-the pen testers 
Validate -A document with all 
the treat defined. 
 
-The project lead 
-The developer team 
-The test team 
-The Quality officer 
 
-The project team 
 
Criteria 
Time to implement: Fast 
 Justifications 
• This methodology does not require to involve all the hierarchy 
• It focuses on one project/system 
• It does not require a lot of workshop 
Level of skill: None 
 Justifications 
• The steps are straight forward 
• The data flow modelling and the STRIDE classification makes it easy to implement 
• The methodology is easy to understand 
Readability: Easy 
• One could use the data flow diagram and visually explain where the threats are. 
• There is not a lot of document created. 
• The target audience is partially the one who did the study. 
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Scope: Low 
• It does not take into account the organisation parameters. 
• It focuses on one project/system. 
• Some threats could easily be missed. 
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Elevation of Privilege  
Origins 
This tool has been developed by Adam Shostack and it uses the classification from the STRIDE 
methodology. 
Purpose 
The threat modelling tends to be used by only one person, and sometime by juniors since they 
are easy to implement. Therefore, this task is not always rewarding. The purpose of this tool is 
to make threat modelling a fun and cooperative activity. It will encourage each participant to 
participate and they will get an instant feedback on their proposed threat. Also, by trying to fit 
the threat card to win, the players will be creative which is a good thing to be sure not to miss 
a threat. 
Process 
The objectives 
The goal of this game is to: 
• Win the game! 
• Detect the threat on the studied system. 
The contributors 
• The project team 
The steps and how to proceed 
First, like for the Microsoft threat modelling methodology, a data flow diagram must be drawn. 
In the figure 23 we can see an example. 
 
Figure 23: data flow diagram example [source Adam Shostack] 
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This tool that is in fact a card game composed of 84 cards. See figure 24 an example of card. 
Each card has 3 information on it: 
• The threat classification 
One of the 6 STRIDE categories 
• A text with an example 
This is the threat that they have to try to put on the data flow diagram. 
• The value 
Depending on the threat, the classification can go from 2 to King 
 
Figure 24: EOF card 
The deck is distributed to all the participants (between 3 and 6 people). The one who is starting 
to play is the one having the 3 of tampering. So, for example the first player reads the text on 
his card and places it somewhere on the data flow diagram (see figure 25).  
 
Figure 25: card played by James 
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Of course the other participant contests this card and then the player needs to argue on why he 
finds that the element targeted is threaten by the card he just played. If the player accepts finally 
the card, a ‘bug’ is created with the justification, the player who played the card and the score 
(see figure 27). The next player can play one of his cards with the same category (see figure 26) 
and continue the game. 
 
Figure 26: card played by Manu 
 
 
Figure 27: notes taken for each hand 
If a player does not have a card in his hand with the same category, he can play another category. 
After each round, the winner is the one with the highest score. An elevation of privilege card 
can also be played and in this case, it is the highest valued card that wins. 
For the next round, the winner of the previous game can choose the category of the card. 
The produced outputs 
• A list of documented bugs 
Synthesis 
• The originality and the fun approach of this game will motivate the team to find 
threats. 
• The players are not afraid to raise issues that could sometimes be known but 
voluntarily hidden. 
• Since all the items of the diagram are not systematically analysed, it could lead 
to undetected threats. 
• It does not consider the organisational threats. 
• It pushes the developer to be creative. 
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• It raises the awareness of the team. 
When we read the rules of this tools, we can help to compare it to the poker game used in some 
Agile implementation methodology. For companies that already have this kind of approach, 
It is a perfect tool, and we could imagine having different skills assembled around the table 
which would bring more points of view and accuracy in the results. Also, like all the cooperative 
tools, it allows to raise the knowledge of the employees. 
 The 
contributors 
The outputs The targeted 
group 
The game 
The project team -a winner! 
-a list of bugs for 
which a control must 
be found. 
-The team that will 
decide how the 
controls need to be 
implement. 
 
Criteria 
Time to implement: Fast 
 Justification 
• Very easy to put in place. 
• Can be initiated by the project leader without the hierarchy involvement 
Level of skill: None 
 Justification 
• Everyone can participate and learn! 
Readability: Easy 
• Simple list of threats for each component. 
Scope: Low 
• Like for the STRIDE technique it focusses on the application on a more technical level. 
It does not take into consideration the organisation parameters. 
• If the level of knowledge of the players is too low threats risks to stay undetected. 
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T-MAP 
Purpose 
This framework has an asset centric approach. For T-MAP (Threat Modelling Attack Paths 
analysis) if we have a lot of unsecured access to the system. It means that there are many risks 
that this system is attacked. It also takes into consideration on which system the access is. If the 
access allows to consult the lunch menu of the canteen it is less sensitive that the personal data 
of the employees. To define scenarios that could lead to a threat, T-MAP will use an attack 
point of view and it will use an “attack path” to detect the scenarios. 
Process 
The objectives 
This framework will define a severity for all the different “attack paths” considering the 
technical level of the security vulnerability but also it will take into account the threats impacts. 
T-MAP will then quantify the threat by taking the total of the severity for all the “attack paths”. 
[28]  
The contributors 
• The security expert. 
• The stakeholders concerned by the study. 
The steps and how to proceed 
1. In order to determine what the valuable assets are, the expert will need first to list all 
the stakeholders and see what they consider to be the assets.  
2. Then the expert need to assess the value of these assets. This will allow him to estimate 
the necessary security measures in order to protect them. (There is no need to put in 
place expensive security measure to hide the canteen menu) 
3. Analysis based on the attack tree 
Each attack path will define: 
o What security breach the attacker could use to enter the system. 
o How the security criteria (confidentiality, integrity…) can damage the assets of 
the company. (data breach, reputation…) 
In figure 28 we can see different attack path that could be used by the attackers. We can see 
that there are four layers in the conceptual business representation of an attack path. For 
each layer we have attributes that are used to describe them. 
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Figure 28 : Attack path. Source [Value Driven Security Threat Modelling Based on Attack Path Analysis] 
  
The four layers are: 
1. Access: The available access for an attacker 
2. Vulnerability: That could be exploited by the attackers (OS, programmes not up-to-date, 
etc.)  
3. Asset: The treasures to defend 
4. Value affected 
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Figure 29: 22 layers attributes. Source [Value Driven Security Threat Modelling Based on Attack Path Analysis] 
 
The next step is to give a value for each attribute that composes an attacking path. We can see 
the list of attributes in figure 29. When we add all the rated attributes we have calculated the 
attack path. 
Finally, all the countermeasures that could mitigate the attack are evaluated. This will allow to 
choose the best solution to manage the risk. 
The produced document 
• Document that lists all the evaluated possible attacks. 
Synthesis 
After analysing this framework, we note that: 
• This framework requires technical knowledge, it is not easy for a developer to put 
himself in the place of an attacker.  
• One of the advantages is that if an asset changes we will not need to run a full analysis, 
we can just reassess the path that leads to this asset. 
• It takes the organisation threats into account 
• The results are very extensive and not intend for a simple developer 
• It uses an extensive database as base of knowledge 
This methodology was not easy to analyse. There is not a lot of literature on it and those that I 
found were very extensive and not easy to read and understand for someone with my 
experience.  
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 The 
contributors 
The output The target 
Implementation 
-Experts 
-Organisation ‘s 
stakeholders 
- Document that list 
all the evaluated 
possible attacks. 
 
-experts 
 
Criteria 
Time to implement: normal 
 Justifications 
• The most difficult part is to gather all the informations, assets, values,etc. 
• Part of the implementation is automatized. 
Level of skill: Advanced 
Justifications 
• It requires specialized security knowledge. 
Readability: complex 
 Justifications 
• A very precise and technical description of each path that could lead to a data breach 
• It requires security knowledge to understand 
Scope: detailed 
 Justifications 
• This framework allows to take into consideration threats from the project but also the 
organisation.  
• It uses a huge database of knowledge to find the attack path. 
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LINDDUN 
Historic 
LINDDUN is a threat modelling methodology that was created by researchers at the Leuven 
University and published in 2015. 
Purpose 
The data privacy is something we have talked about a lot during these last two years. The cause 
is probably the new European data protection regulation that has been applied since May 2018. 
Because this field is very specific and requires regulations or law knowledge, the methodology 
will help the developers, the analysts, the architects to take into account the data privacy issues 
as of the beginning of the project (privacy by design) which by the way is required by the new 
European regulation.[31][32] One of the big advantages is that LIDDUN will allow non data 
expert to detect data privacy threats. 
Process 
LINDDUN is composed of 6 steps, three for the threats identification, and three to bring 
solutions to deal with the identified threats. Like STRIDE, LINDDUN allows the classification 
of threats in seven categories: 
• Linkability 
This category gathers all the threats that could allow a personal data to be linked with 
other personal data of the same person. For example, if someone has my email address 
they could go on Facebook and link this email address with my name. 
• Identifiability 
This could be linked with the previous category since the same example works. But let 
us take another example. If someone succeeds in to obtaining my address, they could 
do a search on the white pages and find my name. 
• Non-repudiation 
This category regroups the threats where people could do some process or attackers on 
behalf of someone and there is no way to prove that they did it or did not. A solution for 
those threats could be logging for example. 
• Detectability 
This one means for example if someone subscribes to a newsletter about European 
election, one could deduce that this person is pro-European. 
• Disclosure of information 
This is more a security threat. 
• Unawareness 
When collecting personal data, one must ensure that the data subject is correctly 
informed. 
• Non-compliance 
This could be the result of all the other categories. If they are not sufficiently covered 
the information system and his context is not considered as compliant. 
Now let us define 2 phases of the methodology that each consist in three steps. 
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Problem Space 
The objectives 
This first phase is the most important one in the methodology. It is here that the data privacy 
threat will be identified. 
The contributors 
• The project team 
• The analyst 
• The architect 
• The project manager 
• Eventually a data protection expert 
The steps and how to proceed 
There are three steps in this phase 
1. To create a data flow diagram 
We know that this data flow diagram is a starting point for many threats modelling 
techniques. This will be used in the next steps. (Please Refer to Chapter Dataflow 
Diagram for more information.) 
2. The second step consists in a simple algorithm like for the STRIDE methodology. For 
each element of the data flow diagram, check if one of the LINDDUN categories can 
apply. A little tips for that, if you go on their tree catalogues (figure 30) you can see 
where the item you are analysing can eventually fit. For example if you are analysing 
an entity you see that only linkability, identifiability and unawareness could apply. 
 
 
Figure 30: LINDDUN tree catalogue 
This step will produce a table that will map each item of the data flow to a threat category. 
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3. To identify threat scenario 
This step consists in another small algorithm to apply, for each X that we identified in 
the LINDDUN template table in step two, we need to analyse whether a threat scenario 
exists. Here again we can use the tree catalogue to help to identify all the threat scenario. 
For example, let’s say that in my table I have an entity that has an X in the linkability 
column. I click on the linkability of the entity that is in the figure 30, I will be led to a 
nice attack tree that we can see on figure 31. 
 
Figure 31: Linkability threat tree 
Each leaf corresponds to a threat and if it is applicable to the element we are analysing 
then the identified threat is documented. For all the remaining leaves, LINDDUN 
requires to document them as assumption and if a change is done to the assumption, it 
is easy to check if a new threat is created or not. All the used attack tree can be found 
on the LINDDUN tree catalogues: https://linddun.org/catalog.php 
 
The produced outputs 
• A data flow diagram 
• A table that maps for all the items in the data flow, the threat category that could apply 
• A list of threats for each mapping done in step 2 
• A list of assumptions 
Solution space 
The objectives 
This phase intends to create from the detected threat in the first phase, some mitigation plan to 
control those threats. The methodology is less specific on who is supposed to deal with those 
threats. Like the phase before it is composed of three steps. 
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The contributors 
• The management 
• The project team 
• The security expert 
• The data protection expert 
The step and how to proceed 
1. To prioritize the threats 
This step is less developed in the methodology. The goal here is to do an evaluation and 
a prioritisation but no real method is provided. There is definitely a need for a risk 
assessment study that will probably include at some point the management that will 
decide what risk to mitigate. 
2. Elicitation of mitigation strategies 
During this phase the selected threats will be mitigated. For that, we need of course a 
security expert to put in place the control but also data protection expert. For example, 
we could see that a threat where by unawareness an employee has downloaded personal 
data on his computer to print it. This could be a violation of the privacy policy put in 
place by the company so a solution could be training sessions to raise the awareness of 
the company on data privacy and protection points. 
Let us not forget that if no experts are available LINDDUN provides mitigation 
suggestion to elicit the threats like we can see on figure 32. 
 
 
Figure 32: LINDDUN threat suggestion 
3. To select corresponding privacy enhancing technology 
Most of the time there are multiple possibilities to mitigate a threat, depending on the 
context one or another will be selected. To help with that choice, LINDDUN provides 
a table with suggested solutions for the data privacy threat.  
The produced output 
• Document with a threat prioritisation. 
• A list of mitigation strategies. 
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• A list of selected mitigation strategies 
Synthesis 
This is a very interesting methodology especially today with all the fuss we have around the 
GDPR. It clearly needs to be compiled with others to provide a full risk assessment, but it also 
fills a hole in all the risk management and threat methodology that we analysed until here. But 
as we will see in the implementation later, implementing this methodology is not enough to 
guarantee that the application is compliant. 
 The contributors The outputs The target 
Problem Space 
 
-The project team 
-The analyst 
-The architect 
-The project manager 
-Eventually a data 
protection expert 
 
-A dataflow diagram 
-A table that maps 
for all the item in the 
data flow the threat 
category that could 
apply 
-A list of threat for 
each mapping done 
in step 2 
-A list of assumption 
 
-The project team 
- The management 
Solution Space 
 
-The management 
-The project team 
-Security expert 
-Data protection 
expert 
 
-Document with a 
threat prioritisation. 
-List of mitigation 
strategies. 
-List of selected 
mitigation strategies 
 
-The management 
-The project team 
-Security expert 
-Data protection 
expert 
 
 
Criteria 
Time to implement: Normal 
• The methodology is simple but complete 
• For example, in step 3, many threats trees have to be analysed. It takes time. 
• A separate risk assessment needs to be conducted 
Level of skill: Normal 
• We have to be honest, having an awareness of the data protection regulation is more 
than helpful for this methodology. Nevertheless, no need to be an expert in data 
protection law and that is the advantage of this methodology. 
Readability: Comprehensible 
• The produced document is a clear and prioritised list of threats with their mitigation 
plans. 
Scope: Low 
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• This methodology focusses only on the data privacy threats. 
Discussion 
After analysing those methodologies, we can already draw some points of attention that we 
could use for the comparison between risk management and assessment and the threat 
modelling approaches. 
• It is easier to understand. 
• It allows to include developers in the process. 
• Less organisation-focus, we rarely see mention of organisation or management terms 
when we look at the goals. 
• It is more technical. 
• It is faster to implement. 
• For most of them, they can start only when the architecture or the model is finished. 
It is clear that it is the need of cheaper, faster and more effective security assessment that have 
brought these tools to life. Another great advantage of these tools is that we can combine them 
to do what we want! For example, we could imagine using the STRIDE methodology for all 
the security risk and bring LINDDUN from the beginning of the project to help consider the 
privacy regulations requirements.   
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Chapter 5: Experimentation 
In this chapter, we will implement one risk assessment methodology and one threat modelling. 
The goal is not to do a full risk assessment that would take too much time, but we will focus on 
the data privacy threats. The two selected methodologies are EBIOS and LINDDUN. 
Project context 
For the European elections 2019, the web communication unit is willing to use a tool that will 
allow to target data subjects and deliver them with personalised information. Therefore, they 
also need a website easily customisable to allow users to subscribe and to take steps into their 
engagement (pledge to vote, recruit friends, organize events…). With the new European 
regulation on data privacy, the management received strong requirements about the respect of 
the data privacy regulation for all the webservices. This risk assessment will especially focus 
on the risks that concern the data protection regulation and the respect of this one. The project 
itself will be subcontracted to a contractor but for the purpose of this study case we will 
extrapolate the architecture of the solution to identify the major risks. We will consider the 
material or the technology from which the management requires guarantees as assets to identify 
the risks and demand a solution or guarantee from the subcontractor. 
EBIOS experimentation 
Like we defined in the analysis, the EBIOS methodology is composed of 5 modules, we will 
not blindly follow all the steps of the module since the goal here is not to do a full risk 
assessment but for each of them, we will: 
• explain what we did and how 
• Explain the results 
• Give a feedback on the impression during the implementation, if it was easy to 
implement (easy, medium, hard) 
The 5 modules of the EBIOS methodology are: 
• Context and scope 
• Sources 
• Strategic scenario 
• Operational scenario 
• Mitigation plan 
I will divide the analysis of the implementation into two parts: 
1. The setup phase 
This phase corresponds to the gathering of information about the context, and the 
composition of the stakeholders, it is the output of this phase that will allow the 
identification of the scenario and the risks. 
2. The risk identification phase 
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This is the most critical phase, based on the phase 1, we will identify the dreaded events 
and the risks that could trigger them. 
 
The setup phase 
 
First step and I am already facing an issue, the syndrome of the white page… Even after 
having spent days studying and analysing this methodology, I had no clues how to start. 
So, my first reflex was to go and find existing implementation example or a template. With 
EBIOS it was not difficult to find, you have both examples and empty templates. This was 
quite comforting because when you have template it means you just have to fill them in and 
follow the steps. Well this feeling did not stay for long. I quickly realised that all the 
examples that I founded, and the templates were from the previous version of EBIOS so the 
structure was not exactly the same. Finally, I decided to use my own structure but still 
keeping the objective of the methodology. 
For the first part I ended up with the following structure: 
 
 
Figure 33: context and scope 
In the figure 33, I gave a context to the project but also to the study by precising that the 
study will focus more on the data privacy risks. After that I naturally realised that an 
overview of the system was needed. And for that I decided to create a modelling of the 
architecture. I want to insist on the fact that when I realise that study, I had no knowledge 
of the modelling or threat modelling techniques! The result, pretty basic, can be seen in 
figure 34. 
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Figure 34: system information schema 
 
This modelling view was also in one of the examples that I found. Of course, the schema 
was much more detailed but in my context, I had less information about the system and the 
scope was reduced. 
Once the context was defined, I passed to the next points of the methodology which was:  
• The definition of the scope 
For that I simply explained what subject of the study and the expected goal. In figure 
35 we have the description of those two points. 
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Figure 35: study scope and goals 
This phase again was not too difficult, because the study is not too complex. 
• The identification of the goods (essential and physical) 
For this phase, as requested by the methodology, I listed all the essential and 
physical goods that compose the information system. In order to do that I used the 
modelization that I did in point 1.3. Having a schema helps to have a good overview 
and insure not to forget something. During this step 4, processes have been identified 
and 3 physical goods have been listed. 
 
1. The essential goods (4 Processes) 
• To recruit and build the community. 
• To interact with them in a tailor-made manner and via various channels of 
communication including email communication, social media, text 
messages and other tools, available through our web-based platform. 
• Managing the website. 
• Managing the data subject information: it regroups all the information that 
we gathered from the data subject. 
 
2. The physical goods 
• The servers: they host the website, the administration interface and the 
tool itself. 
▪ The databases: will contain all the data subject’s information.  
▪ The European Parliament networks. 
▪ The employee desktop and devices. 
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Note that the schema was not enough, a brain storming was also necessary, I had to 
ask questions to the business owner to be sure to have all the processes. So again, 
this step is based on the knowledge of the information system. 
• The security measure already taken  
For this step I also used the schema to identify all the points where the security was 
already in place. Of course, it gives you just a hint at where to look. To know the 
exact details of the already implemented measure you need to have the knowledge, 
which means organise workshops, interviews, meetings… In figure 36 you can see 
the identified existing security measures. 
 
Figure 36: identified security measures 
 
• The definition of the criteria and their evaluation 
The last step of ‘setup’, I call that setup because all we have done until now is gather 
information in order to identify risks, is the definition of the constrain to consider 
and that will impact the risk assessment. I our case it will be: 
1. The new data protection regulation 
This regulation entered into force in December 2018 fir the European institution 
is a serious requirement for the project, this regulation has been largely covered 
by the media and it is the European parliament that voted it. So, it is crucial that 
the project can prove the compliance with it. 
 
2. The different stakeholders 
This project is used by a lot of stakeholders, the fact that they are not in the same 
office even not in the same country, will increase the difficulty of controls. 
 
3. The data protection officer 
For each decision that has to do with the data privacy, the DPO will have to be 
consulted, his advice will have to be considered.  
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Synthesis 
Let us have a look to what was produced until now. 
Steps Output Difficulty 
Context -Context of the study. 
-Context of the information 
system 
easy 
Risk study -Scope of the study 
-The essential and physical 
goods 
-The security measure already 
in place 
Medium 
-Security analysis -The list of already taken 
measures 
medium 
 
We already have a good list of documents that will allow us to do the next steps. For me the 
template that I found were very helpful, even I did not used them completely, some of the table 
were going to into details for the scope. One thing we note is that all the information field until 
now is knowledge based. Which means that if I had to do this in a real project, I should have 
passed a lot of time in meetings to get all this information and probably I would have much 
more information than what I have found alone.  
On the other side the exercise is not that difficult, I have to admit that some of the table that 
was in the template were more complex to fill, that is why I skipped them but I think this is 
because the scope of the study is not big enough and I did not really have any relevant 
information for these steps. 
 
The risk identification phase 
Here I continue to try to follow as I can the methodology. The next logical step is: 
1. The identification of the threat source 
For that I used the tree proposed by the methodology that will help me to identify 
the sources. It presents itself like a table that we need to fill in, see figure 37 to see 
the one I did. 
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Figure 37: threat source 
This part is not difficult, and the table allows to do it fast, of course you need to 
have the answers… And like we saw during the analysis normally this step is 
done with different contributors.  
2. The metrics definition 
This step is very important and should normally involve the management. They 
are supposed to give the security requirement. For this phase I defined the three 
security criteria that I wanted to consider: 
- Availability 
- Integrity 
- Data privacy 
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For each of them I added the scale that will be used to evaluate the risks on these 
criteria. (Refer to point 2.7 of annex for the details). 
3. Apprehended events 
Here we are going to identify all the dreaded events. I found in the template example 
a table that helped me to format this phase in an easy and readable way. See figure 
37 to see the result. 
 
Figure 38: dreaded events 
Again, I extrapolate the requirement since I am alone to do this risk assessment but 
normally other contributors should express their concerns and help to assess the impacts. 
After that I have to say that the methodology started to be too complicated in his 
implementation, again I think that the scope of the study data privacy is the cause of that 
difficulty to follow all the steps of the methodology. What I did is follow the principle, 
but I did not use the table that was provided in the template. 
For each dreaded event I have identify possible scenario. In figure 39 you can see an 
example of analysis for one dread event with: 
- The probability 
- The impact 
- The security requirements 
- The possible scenarios 
This will allow us to evaluate all these dreaded events to help the management to make 
decision on what should be mitigated.  
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Figure 39: example of scenario and evaluation for a dreaded event 
After the realisation of this step I decided to create a matrix that gives a quick idea of 
the risks and their impacts. You can see this in figure 40. This representation is much 
appreciated because it avoids the reading of all the scenarios and only focus on those 
they need to take into consideration. 
 
Figure 40: RA chart 
4. Action plan 
After that, a mitigation plan has been proposed for all the dreaded event. I chose as 
example (figure 41) the fact that the contractor does not respect the regulation. To 
be able to put in place this mitigation plan I had to consult with legal service, data 
protection coordinator, data protection office. And each time I asked question the 
intermediary had to check for the answer. This is because the regulation is quite 
new, and nobody had experience with it. This mitigation plan was quite time 
consuming. 
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Figure 41: mitigation plan regulation compliance 
This was the last phase of my implementation tool 
Synthesis 
Let us have a look to what has been produced in this phase. 
 
Output Difficulty 
The identification of the 
threat source 
 
-List of the source 
threat(table) 
-easy 
The metrics definition -List of criteria 
-List of scale for the criteria 
-easy 
Apprehended event -list of dreaded events 
-List of scenarios for each 
event 
-Evaluation for each dread 
event 
-Risk matrix overview 
-Medium 
Action plan -list of proposed action plan 
for each dreaded event 
-hard 
 
As you can see most of these steps are easy to perform, the knowledge is very difficult to have 
and unfortunately except for the last part I was not able to have all the necessary contributors 
for the assessment. But the last part shows me that the meetings request, to ask information are 
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very time consuming. This methodology is clearly not applicable alone since she does not 
provide a lot of tool to help you. Like we said during the analysis threat modelling could be 
used to help the detection of stakeholders, entity, threat…  
Another thing also is that the methodology is clearly not adapted to the data privacy risks. The 
fact that we list the assets and the stakeholders at the beginning help a little, but it is clearly not 
enough. People with knowledge need to assess the system to detect all the treat, and there is no 
existing controls that we certify that all the threat have been identified. 
Since it requires a lot of contributors to be relevant and a lot of knowledge/expert to be efficient 
it confirm the observation done in the analysis part that the methodology is time consuming and 
not fit for small companies since it required a lot of resources. 
We have also confirmed the targeted audience of the result of this methodology. It is clearly the 
management that will use this document to decide what risk to mitigate. (The risk matrix helps 
a lot).  
Note that naturally a basic modelization of the system has been done at the beginning. Like I 
said when I did this implementation, I didn’t even know what threat modelling was. It proves 
that naturally a modelling of the system helps to have a good overview and to identify different 
elements. Cleary in this case a data flow diagram would have been useful. 
At some point I was also confused, I am not sure why but I can see to possible reason: 
1. I do not have enough experience 
The methodology is composed of 5 modules and a lot of steps, the link between the 
steps and the result produced is not always easy to understand. Also I found the 
vocabulary heavy, I am a French speaker and I had to read sometimes four or five 
time the sentence to finally understand it. With time it became too heavy and that’s 
why I decide to tailor a little bit the template that I founded. 
2. The methodology was not fit for data privacy 
This is another possibility, all the tables that I saw in the example makes sense when 
I read them, but for my case I was sometimes incapable to fill them. 
Criteria 
For the evaluation I will keep the same value that I had for the methodology analysis. 
Time to implement: Long 
 Justifications 
• Specially for all the contributor to involve and the knowledge to gather 
Level of skill: Advanced 
 Justifications 
• The methodology is long, the document produced is long 
• The link between steps in not easy to understand 
Readability: comprehensible  
 Justifications 
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• I keep this notation, but the condition is that the result is presented to the 
manager, with visuals like modelling or risk assessment matrix. 
Scope: Detailed 
 Justifications 
• Like for the analysis if the knowledge and the resources are not a problem, 
the granularity of the result can be very high. 
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LINDDUN methodology experimentation 
For the threat modelling approach, I chose LINDDUN for several reasons: 
1. It is a methodology specially designed to detect the data privacy threat, in our case 
study it is perfect since we decided to focus on those threats. 
2. The methodology has been developed in Belgium at the KUL University and has 
been cited by ADAM Shostack by one of the most serious methodology for the data 
privacy threats. 
3. Contrary to EBIOS, this methodology provides a lot of tools to help in the detection 
of the threats. 
I will try as much as possible not being influence by the knowledge I have on the data protection 
regulation. 
Like we saw in the analysis this methodology is composed in 2 phases of 3 steps each. 
Problem Phase 
1. Define DFD 
Like we saw in the analysis this is the most important point in the methodology, 
it from this step that all the other will depends, if an entity of the DFD is missing 
it is a complete group of threat that risk being ignore. In figure 42 you can see 
the DFD produced for the information system. Personally I found this schema 
much more interesting that the one I created during the EBIOS implementation, 
this is partly due to the fact that this one respect a defined notations. 
 
Figure 42: data flow diagram  
The definition of the DFD is not a difficult step, you just need to have the 
architect with you and if he is not available a simple architecture diagram can be 
sufficient. 
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2. Map privacy threats to DFD elements 
Like we saw in the analysis this step is very mechanical. For each element of the 
data flow diagram, I checked if one of the LINDDUN categories can apply. I 
used the tips that I defined in the analysis just go through the menu on their 
website and each time a category could applied I just putted X in the table. You 
can see in figure 43 the result of this step. 
 
Figure 43: LINDDUN mapping table 
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  I want to insist here on the fact that I did that purely by following the 
methodology, I did not use my knowledge. 
3. To identify threat scenario 
Here I did two steps: 
First, I listed all the assumptions as requested by the methodology, for that I had 
to do a brainstorming. And I have to admit I had no way to ensure that I did not 
forget anything. So, for this step it is strongly recommended to do it with other 
contributors. 
  The result is a list of assumption like: 
1. The processes that are done in the backend are considered protected since the 
backend has passed the pen-test done by DG-ITEC. The only threat that could come 
from inside it means people are having access to the application. 
2. For the same raison as point 1, the communications between the processes are also 
considered safe. 
3. The communication between the entity and the system are not considered as safe 
since the entity can produce data breach if they do not respect the guidelines and 
also the communication channel is not considered as secure. 
4. Then I listed all the threat scenarios, for that again no knowledge is required, I just 
followed the threat trees that are provided by the methodology, see the analysis for 
more information. I used the following structure for each threat 
 
- Identifier of the threat 
- Summary  
To quickly give a context to the scenario 
- Primary actors 
The source of the threat 
- Basic path 
List of all the path used by the actor to implement the treat 
- Consequences 
List of all the impacts if the threat is implemented 
- Reference to the treat tree node(s) 
This is the unique identifier of the threat in the tree attack. 
  You can see in figure 44 one of the identified scenario. 
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Figure 44: scenario definition 
 
Let us have a recap on this first phase. 
 output Difficulty 
Define a DFD -Data flow diagram Easy 
Mapping privacy threat -List LINDDUN mapping Easy 
Threat scenario 
identification 
-List of scenarios 
-list of assumptions 
Easy 
 
For the moment, the comparison with the EBIOS implementation is just huge. It was much 
simpler at the start, I just had to flow the algorithms defined by the methodology. I must admit 
when I did this study I had much more experience with risk assessment and threat modelling 
but still the simplicity of this methodology is, for the moment, bluffing. 
Let us continue with the second phase. 
Solution space 
Like for the first phase, this one is also composed of 3 steps 
1. Prioritize threats 
Here a risk assessment was supposed to be done, unfortunately LINDDUN does not 
provide any instruction for this part… This is not blocking for us since we don’t have 
the decision responsibility but still it sad that LINDDUN has a hole here. On the other 
side we could complete this methodology by using a risk assessment methodology from 
another framework. 
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2. Elicit mitigation strategies & Select corresponding privacy enhancing 
technologies 
For the two remaining point I have to say that I have been a little bit confuse by the tool 
they provided. I tried to look for examples, but unfortunately in the three examples they 
provided none of them describe in detail this step. So, what I did is simple go through 
the threats and proposed mitigation plan for each of them. I know I have tailored a little 
bit the methodology here, but it seems to be the right thing to do. In figure 45 you can 
see the proposed measures for one of the identified threats. 
 
Figure 45: threats mitigation plan 
 output difficulty 
Prioritize threats 
 
-risk assessment -medium 
Elicit strategies -List of mitigation plan -easy 
Select corresponding privacy 
enhancing 
-list of practice to put in place -easy 
 
Synthesis 
This methodology is definitely clearer and easier to implement than EBIOS, the documentation 
is very easy to understand except for the point five and six that need more concrete example 
maybe. 
The tool that the methodology provides are simple to use, it is just an algorithm to follow for 
the step 2 and 3. 
It is imperative though that the data flow diagram is perfectly executed and completed, if not 
since the threat detection is automatic, threats might be ignored. 
I still see some threats undetected or mitigation plan that should be proposed and that are not. 
Like the contractual clauses for the sub-contractors for example. 
97 
 
Criteria 
Time to implement: Normal 
• I’ll keep the same notation, the first steps are not complex but if the DFD is big, there 
is a lot of check and mapping to do when we execute the algorithm. 
Level of skill: Normal 
• I am convinced that a minimum of data protection knowledge is required to perform this 
methodology 
Readability: Comprehensible 
• The produced document is a clear and prioritised list of threats with their mitigation 
plans. 
Scope: Low 
• It will detect only the data privacy threat; it could be complete by the utsage of STRIDE. 
For the security threats. 
Discussion 
EBIOS 
For the first experimentation, EBIOS was selected to do a risk assessment. This methodology 
was chosen because French documentation was available. It seems to be the easiest choice for 
a novice French speaker to understand and implement his first risk assessment. But in the end, 
the methodology and the documentation revealed to be very complex and not easy to 
implement. In addition, many steps where completely useless to implement for our use case so 
not all the steps were implemented. An interesting thing is the way the methodology brings us 
to detect the threats. We have to think a lot about the scenario and a good knowledge of the 
application is required. Same for the data privacy risks. An experience in this field is absolutely 
required to be able to identify the risks, the methodology does not help on that. Workshop of 
several people with all the necessary knowledge is strongly recommended to implement this 
methodology. We can say after this implementation that the methodology allows to detect the 
data privacy risk but specialists are absolutely required in the workshop since the methodology 
does not provide any help to detect those risks. 
LINDDUN 
On the other side we have LINDDUN, a threat modelling methodology exclusively developed 
to help the non-expert to deal with data privacy threats. This tool seems to be the best choice 
since we decided to focus on the data privacy risks. This methodology is very well documented 
and a little bit tricky to implement at the beginning because of the number of criteria’s to check 
and what they actually mean (LINDDUN) but after a while we get used to it and it becomes 
straight forward. It was much faster to start implementing it. It required that the DFD is correct. 
Maybe an architecture diagram could be used and facilitate this modelling. If the DFD is not 
correctly implemented, there is a risk to miss some threats. The catalogue tree also is very 
helpful, we just have to follow the attack tree for each entity. I have to admit it was not easy to 
do the exercise I tried not to use my knowledge of the data privacy regulation when I was 
implementing this methodology just following the steps and I have to admit that a lot of treats 
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are detected but not all of them, some area are not covered by the methodology. For example, I 
was not able to detect that the rights of the data subject were respected. The non-compliance 
(LINDDUN) should be more developed to take into consideration these points. 
Nevertheless, these two examples clearly confirmed what was discovered during the analysis 
of the methodologies. The threat modelling seems definitely easier to implement and is more 
convenient and adapted for environment with less expertise by giving practical tools. On the 
contrary the risk methodology relies more on the expertise of the one who are implementing it. 
But in any case, the two methods could be used together to enhance and ensures that the scope 
is covered.  
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Chapter 6: Comparison 
In this chapter we will use the results of the methodologies, framework and tools we analysed 
to compare them and see in which context those tools should be used. A proposition of possible 
mix of technologies will also be done to facilitate or to have a better result with certain 
methodologies. 
Criteria and differences 
First let us do a recap of our criteria results for all the methodologies. 
 
Time for 
implementation 
Necessary 
skills(complexity) 
Result readability Scope 
EBIOS 
Long Advanced Comprehensible Detailed 
FAIR 
Long Advanced Comprehensible Detailed 
OCTAVE 
Normal Normal Comprehensible Detailed 
FRAP 
Normal Normal Comprehensible Low 
STRIDE 
Fast None Easy Low 
Elevation 
of 
privilege 
Fast None Easy Low 
T-MAP 
Normal Advanced Complex Detailed 
DFD 
Fast None Easy Low 
LINDDUN 
Normal Normal Comprehensible Low 
Table 1: Methodologies Criteria 
• The first thing we can clearly notice is that the risk management and risk assessment 
methodologies are in general heavier to put in place and require more resources and 
competencies than the threat modelling tools. 
• We can see that the scope covered by the risk management methodologies is wider and 
is able to take more elements into consideration. 
• The target result of these tools is also completely different. One is entirely dedicated for 
the management, to help them make decisions by providing them qualitative or 
quantitative description of the risks and relation between the impact and the cost of 
mitigation. The other, threat modelling, is more intended for technical people to help 
them implement security measures and to communicate the threat. 
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• The possibility of tailoring is also something that is obvious. When the risk management 
framework allows and even requires the tailoring of some steps, the threat modelling 
most of the time imposes classification in predefined list, STRIDE is a good example. 
• The threat modelling, especially if we take a software-centric approach, allows to 
involve the developers. This has the big advantage to raise the awareness of the 
developers and will help them to make the correct implementation decisions. 
• Something that we have in the risk management and not in the threat modelling is the 
managing of the opportunities. This could be considered in the threat modelling, but it 
would require tailoring. 
Time of implementation 
When we analyse the table about the methodologies criteria, we can observe that the risk 
management approach is in general more complicated than the threat modelling. There are 
several arguments that explain why. Let us see what the disadvantages of the risk management 
approach are that explain the evaluation for the time implementation criteria. 
Risk management disadvantages 
• It requires involvement and support of the hierarchy 
Since the scope of this approach is wider it needs the contribution of a lot of 
management profiles. 
• The methodology is more complex 
For the analysed methodologies, the documentation is quite extensive, and the 
implementation is then long. 
• The number of documents to produce is high 
Most of the time the methodologies are composed of several phases, and each phase 
needs to produce one or more documents. 
• The lack of tools or template 
This has been particularly felt during the experimentation. It was difficult to begin 
in the absence of a template. 
• The workshop needs 
Since the risk management is based on the knowledge of the participant to identify 
the risks, many meetings are required in order to cover all the risks. 
On the opposite, we have several advantages that explain why the threat modelling approach is 
faster. 
Threat modelling advantages 
• It can be initialised by the project manager with only the help of the development 
team. 
• For the analysed methodologies, they are easy to understand and not heavy (except 
T-map) 
• Those methodologies provide a lot of tools/ templates to help in the implementation. 
 
The necessary skills 
Here again we can see a difference between the risk management and the threat modelling 
methodology. The fact that the risk management methodology requires more skills is explained 
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partially by the same arguments as for the implementation time criteria. The most important 
one is the fact that the threat modelling proposes tools like attack tree or classification based on 
data flow diagram item that allow non expert profiles to detect threat. 
Result readability 
Here is one of the big advantages of the threat modelling. When you have something visual it 
is always easier to understand and to explain or justify. With the risk management we saw in 
the analysis that a lot of documents were produced which makes the information difficult to 
find sometimes. Also, for some risk management methodologies, it was advised to have a 
certification to ensure a proper implementation. 
Scope 
Here come the disadvantages of the threat modelling methodology. Since it provides tools to 
detect the threats, it is possible that by strictly following these tools, some threats might be 
missed. This can be caused by the lack of knowledge. Another disadvantage is that the threat 
modelling methodology focuses on one information system and dismisses by default external 
threats. 
When to use which methodology 
With all these points it is obvious that the risk management and the threat modelling 
methodologies must be used in different contexts. We will list different contexts and for each 
framework give an appreciation whether it is advised to use it or not. Note that it is an 
appreciation based only on the theoretical analysis that has been done in this thesis and 
confirmed by the implementation done on the use case defined in the chapter 6. For this table 
we do not consider specialised companies that could have special needs in security risk 
management, even if they are small. We also consider that each methodology will be used 
exclusively by the organisation.  
102 
 
 
 
Small 
company(<50p) 
Big 
company 
Short 
time(budget) 
Experience 
required 
For 
management 
For 
developers 
EBIOS 
No Yes No Yes Yes No 
FAIR 
No Yes No Yes Yes No 
OCTAVE 
No Yes No Yes Yes No 
FRAP 
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
STRIDE 
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Elevation 
of privilege Yes No Yes No No Yes 
T-MAP 
Yes No No Yes No Yes 
DFD 
Yes No Yes No No Yes 
LINDDUN 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Table 2: Context use 
If we analyse this table, we can see that the threat modelling is clearly easier to put in place for 
the small companies. This is due to the low implementation cost and the group to which the 
results are targeted to. What is important for a small company is that the product that it created 
presents as less vulnerabilities as possible, the context is less important. On the opposite, for a 
big company, external threats must be taken into consideration. This requires a more analytical 
approach and requires a larger scope which means more time and more experience required as 
well.  
Size of the company 
Let us compare first the risk management and the threat modelling in the context of the size of 
the company first.  The table is quite clear here. The risk management is clearly the preference 
for the big companies and is not suitable for small companies. This is due to several factors: 
1. The scope 
• Risk management methodology 
Like we saw in the analysis, the risk management methodology provides the 
possibility to take into consideration all the aspects of the organisation. Risks 
like reputational damages would be easily considered since their impact could 
be catastrophic for the organisation. We can say that the bigger the company is, 
the longer the list of risks is. The scope from where these risks could come from 
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is also more extended. And of course, the impact and the consequences if a risk 
should occur is also bigger.  
• Threat modelling 
On the other hand, let us take the example of a small company that is doing 
development of IT solutions. The scope where the risk could come is much 
more reduced. The most important for these kinds of company is to deliver a 
product that respects the defined specifications in the allowed budget. And of 
course, this solution must be robust. So, in this case, the scope of the analysis 
will be much more focused on the application itself. 
 
2. The strategic decision of the mitigation plan 
• Risk management methodology 
Like we said just before the impact of the risks in a big company can be 
catastrophic on a human or financial point of view. So, in order to decide on a 
mitigation plan, the study must consider the point of view of all the experts in 
the company. As we saw in the analysis, the risk management methodologies 
are taking more high-level contributors and that will allow the decision people 
to have all the necessary input.  
• Threat modelling 
On the other hand, in the smaller companies, like we saw in the previous 
example, the important thing is to deliver a quality product. Most of the time, 
the responsibility of this is on the project manager’s shoulders. The threat 
modelling approach will provide him with the tools to implement on the scope 
of his project.  
The budget 
In the small or big companies, the profitability is also crucial. Since the smaller company have 
by definition smaller projects, their budget is also reduced, so it is important for them to use an 
approach that will allow them to: 
• Focus the study on what is really necessary. 
• Have the tools that allow to detect the risks even if there is no expert available. 
• Increase the efficiency of the development process. 
When we look at the column budget of the table context use, we can see a clear distinction 
between risk management (higher cost) and threat modelling methodology approach. The threat 
modelling approach is a much lighter and focused in a way that can easily be used by the project 
manager with the help of his own team to control the threats. The project manager will have all 
the information to take action to control the risks, and the fact that he used his own team to 
identify the threats will also raise the awareness of his team and improve the development 
phase. Let us not forget the time. There is no need in the threat modelling approach to do 
multiple workshop with experts or people external to the project. The implementation is 
therefore much faster. 
The required experience 
Here again there is a clear distinction between the risk management and the threat modelling 
approach. This is partially explained by the provided tools. 
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• The risk management methodology 
This approach is mostly based on the knowledge, which means that the risks 
identification will be done by the experts. Some methodologies like FRAP will provide 
guidelines to organise those meetings, such as the agenda, the required output or the 
contributors that should attend. 
• Threat modelling  
With these approaches we will have tools at our disposition that will allow the detection 
of the threats, even if we do not have experts in the team. I take the LINDDUN 
methodology as example that will provide the possibility to easily identify the dreaded 
scenarios and detect the threats for each of them without having knowledge of the data 
privacy regulation. 
We have an exception here with T-MAP framework that ask the developer to have an attacker 
point of view. This is not easy for a developer. If I quote the words of Adam Shostack “It is like 
asking to a developer to think like a professional chef ”. That is why a certain level of knowledge 
is required for this approach.  
The targeted audience 
This is something that is clearly defined in the analysis part. When you do a study and you are 
using a risk management methodology the ultimate goal of the risk assessment part is to provide 
sufficient information to the management to be able to make decision. If you compare the 
different contributors in the analysis part for the risk management and for the threat modelling 
approach, we saw that the risk management tends to involve more high-level profiles like 
architects, CSO…etc. And the outputs of the different phases are also more targeted for 
management profiles. This is also something to take into consideration when we choose the 
approach.   
For a project manager, it will be much more interesting to use a threat modelling approach that 
will make participate his project team and improve the knowledge and the efficiency of his 
team.  
Complementarity 
We defined at the beginning of this thesis the differences between risk management, risk 
assessment and threat modelling. What we can see is that risk management methodologies could 
be tailored to use or to be completed by threat modelling tools. Let us take the example of an 
organisation which decides to use OCTAVE to deal with the risk management. We saw the 
goals of OCTAVE are: 
• To create a list of the essential goods of the company 
• To list all the vulnerabilities and threats to these goods and the cost if a threat occurs 
• To summarize the enhancements of the process to mitigate the risks (risk plan) 
All with the purpose of helping the management to make decision.  
If we implement it like that, clearly the knowledge will stay at the management level and will 
not necessarily be shared or consulted by the more technical people. Also, there is a risk to miss 
threats since the people involved in the risk assessment are not necessary the ones implementing 
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the solution. A good practice would be to use Elevation of privilege that gives the opportunity 
to involve developers and is easy to put in place. 
What is true for threat modelling is also true for other risks assessment methodologies. For 
example, we could use FAIR in complement to OXTAVE risks assessment methodology. FAIR 
would bring a more quantitative information thanks to its sheets. That will help to explain and 
defend the conclusion of the OCTAVE risks assessment to the management. 
It is already done! 
It is not obvious but when we analyse the EBIOS methodology we can see the methodology is 
already using threat modelling more specifically attack-tree. It is just that it is presented as a 
checklist in the threat sources point. 
When we come to a choice, the table of criteria could be used of course but we have to keep in 
mind that every organisation, every project has its own context. Strictly following one 
methodology or a specification is not necessarily a good thing and worst it could lead to ignore 
risks. The risk management methodology and the threat modelling due to their different focus 
and different documents produced can be considered as two complementary methodologies. 
But it has a cost in time and requires, sometimes, experts. So the complementarity will be easier 
implemented by the big companies rather than the small companies that should use only threat 
modelling if the budget is short.  
Lack of skills 
It is possible that even in a bigger company the lack of skill prevents the detection of certain 
threats, like the data privacy threats for example. Like we saw in the experimentation the usage 
of LINDDUN in the risk assessment phase of OCTAVE will complete the analysis and 
complete the scope of the study without having to pay an extra consultant.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and 
recommendations 
The information systems are becoming more and more critical in our society. Even laws like 
the new European data protection regulation bring new needs and vulnerability into information 
systems. In consequence, more and more tools and methodologies appear to help dealing with 
these vulnerabilities. All those available tools can be really confusing and yet it is crucial to 
choose the right approach from the beginning. In the thesis, we have first explained the different 
concepts that exist, risk management, risk assessment, threat modelling. Then we described and 
analysed nine tools that could be used. After that we implemented the EBIOS methodology and 
the LINDDUN technique to one use case to have a practical experience. For each of the 
analysed tools we have suggested the context in which they should be used. We also explained 
the differences between the risk management and the threat modelling approach and their 
possible complementarity. 
Risk management 
Most of the risk management methodologies are consuming in times and they need to be 
performed from the beginning of the project (by design) and they absolutely need the 
management support and implication. There is a relation between the complexity of the risk 
management methodologies and the scope covered by the detected risks. Most of these 
methodologies can be and should be tailored to take into account the context of the project, the 
organisation. Tools like threat modelling are perfect to be included into these risk management 
methodologies. 
Threat modelling 
The threat modelling approach does not constitute a full risk management framework. It brings 
another way to detect and assess the threat. They are in general lighter to put in place but 
sometimes the scope they cover is too narrow by classification they proposed, for example 
STRIDE imposes 6 classifications. The big advantage however is that they are much easier to 
implement and if they are mix or incorporate with other risk management or threat modelling 
techniques, they will increase the level of details. Also, when risk management produces 
documents, they are produced for the management most of the time, threat modelling can be 
used and done for and by the developer teams which present certain advantages like raise the 
awareness. The implementation of the LINDDUN methodology also proved that threat 
modelling can provide excellent complementarity to classical risk management methodologies. 
If you take EBIOS for example you don’t have the necessary tools to help you consider the data 
privacy risks. 
We clearly defined that risk management methodologies and threat modelling techniques have 
all their interest. The most important thing when the choice is made is to take into consideration 
the context of the project, the real needs, the budget, the time, the expertise available… All 
these criteria will help to choose the correct methodology. A note of caution though, choosing 
a methodology does not mean blindly following the documentation, on the contrary the tailoring 
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is very important like we saw when experimented the EBIOS one. Remove unnecessary steps, 
use others or add threat modelling techniques to detect risks can prove to be very efficient.   
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Annex 1 EBIOS case study 
The Risk management Framework 
Study subject 
This study will focus on the process on the data by the unit that could lead to a data breach. 
There are 2 main interfaces: 
• The website: where data subjects come and sign up. 
• The user management page: where editors can manage data subjects and send them 
relevant content 
 
The second point that is very important for the management is the availability of the application. 
Many campaigns on social media will be scheduled. These campaigns have a big budget so it’s 
important that when data subjects are brought to the platform, they are able to sign in right 
away. 
Goals 
Identifying the weak point of security in the SI and in the unit especially for the data protection. 
Raise the awareness of the management on the measures to take. 
Prove that the project respects or not the new data privacy regulation. 
 
The identified goods 
The essential goods (4 Process) 
• Recruit and build the community. 
• Interact with them in a tailor-made manner and via various channels of communications 
including email communications, social media, text messages and other tools, available 
through our web-based platform. 
• Managing the website. 
 
• Managing the data subject information: This regroup all the information that we gather 
from the data subject. 
The physical goods 
• The servers: they host the website, the administration interface and the tool itself. 
 
• The databases: will contain all the data subject’s information’s.  
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Parameters to consider 
Several constrains to consider has been identified: 
 
The references that will impact the risk assessment are: 
 
New Data privacy 
regulation. 
The new regulation 2018/1725 will be the references for this risk 
assessment.   
 
The restrictions that will impact the security risk assessment are: 
The editors 
The people who will use the user management tool are not always 
aware about the data privacy and the security. 
The Eplo 
The Eplo are offices present in all the EU countries. They will be 
responsible to manage the users in their country. Their 
knowledge of security and of the tool is limited or null and it’s 
not easy to organise a training with them. 
The contractors A lot of external staff are working within the unit. 
The subcontractor 
The subcontractor that is going to deploy and manage the hosting 
of the application is based in US. This subcontractor is 
considered as processor. 
 
The hypotheses that will impact the security risk assessment are: 
The DPO 
The data privacy became an important subject, it has been voted 
by the European parliament and the regulation 2018/1725 
entered into force 11december 2018. As this tool will be use for 
the European election 2019 it is important that the regulation is 
strictly followed. The Data protection officer will have to be 
consult regularly and we will need to follow his guidelines.   
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Threat sources 
The Treat sources we want to mitigate are: 
 
Types of threat sources Retained or not Examples 
Internal human resource, malicious, 
with weak abilities 
Yes 
✓ An employee could use an 
unlocked computer to get 
access to subject personal 
data. 
Internal human resource, malicious, 
with strong abilities 
Yes 
✓ An employee with access 
to the database could 
cause a data breach by 
exporting data on a usb 
key 
Internal human resource, malicious, 
with unlimited abilities 
No, there is no 
such profile in 
the unit. 
 
External human resource, malicious, 
with weak abilities 
No  
External human resource, malicious, 
with strong abilities 
Yes 
✓ There are a lot of external 
people working for the 
unit from the cleaning 
team to developer and 
even project manager. 
✓ The Subcontractor. 
✓ The subcontractor’s 
employee 
✓ Attack on Subcontractor 
infrastructure 
✓ Hacker trying to steal data 
subject password 
External human resource, malicious, 
with unlimited abilities 
No  
Internal human resource, without 
malice, with weak abilities 
No, if the profile 
is not involved in 
the project there 
is no way he can 
cause a breach. 
 
Internal human resource, without 
malice, with strong abilities 
Yes 
✓ An employee could for 
example print personal 
data to work on it and 
maybe forget to take it at 
the printer. 
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Types of threat sources Retained or not Examples 
Internal human resource, without 
malice, with unlimited abilities 
No, there is no 
such profile in 
the unit. 
✓  
External human resource, without 
malice, with weak abilities 
No  
External human resource, without 
malice, with strong abilities 
No  
External human resource, without 
malice, with unlimited abilities 
No  
Malware No  
Natural phenomenon No  
Natural or sanitary disaster No  
Animal activity No  
Internal event Yes Fire, network issues 
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The used matrix 
The security criteria are: Availability, Integrity, confidentiality.  
In order to express the security requirements, the security criteria are the following: 
 
Security criteria Definitions 
Availability The fact that the service is accessible when we need it 
Integrity The data held in the database must be complete and correct 
Data Privacy Only people who are allowed to have access to data have it 
Availability scale 
The following scale will be used in order to express the needs of security in term of 
availability: 
 
Level of scale Scale description 
12 hours The service must be available in the next 12 hours 
6 hours The service must be available in the next 6 hours 
60 minutes The service must be available in the hour 
Integrity scale 
The following scale will be used in order to express the needs of security in term of integrity: 
 
Level of scale Scale description 
Allowed The data can be wrong if we know it 
mastered The data can be wrong if we know it and the data is restored 
Full The data must be fully correct 
Confidentiality scale 
Who can have access to the data? 
Profile Profile description 
Public Everyone can access it 
Limited 
Only the editors in Brussels or in the Eplo offices can have access to this 
data 
Private 
Only the admin profile or the data subject itself can have access to this 
data 
Probability 
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Scale level 
1. Low 
2. Medium 
3. Strong 
4. Maximal 
 
Impact 
 
Scale level 
1. Low 
2. Medium 
3. Strong 
4. Critical 
Special security need 
For the special security criteria “respect data regulation” the security need will always be 
“respect” since we are bind by law to respect the regulation. 
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Risk assessment 
In this section we are going to enumerate the menaces that we would like to mitigate and 
evaluate them by probability and impact with the metrics described in point 2.5 
Apprehended events 
Events Security needs result Sources Impact 
The data subject’s 
personal data are stolen 
Limited ✓ Data breach: The data can be 
altered, loss, used… 
✓ Weak password 
✓ Not serious employee 
✓ hacker 
Critical 
Not respect the data 
protection law 
Respected ✓ Loss of credibility 
✓ Fines 
✓ Employee’s awareness 
✓ Subcontractor not serious 
Critical 
The data subject’s 
personal information are 
altered 
mastered ✓ Contact wrongly a user 
✓ Loss of subscription 
✓ Database issue 
✓ Employee mistakes 
critical 
The website unavailable 60 minutes 
✓ Not able to recruit people 
✓ Loss of credibility 
 
 
✓ Server issue 
✓ Server attack 
Strong 
The administration 
interface unavailable 
6 hours 
✓ Not able to manage people. 
✓ Not able to contact people. 
✓ Not able to treat the S.A.R. 
 
✓ Server issue 
✓ Server attack 
Strong 
 
User Session stolen 
• Probability: Strong 
• Impact: Low to critical. It depends whether if it’s a simple user who got his 
password, in this case only his data will be compromise but if it’s the session of 
an admin profile then the entire data base could be compromised. 
• Apprehended events: The data subject’s personal data are stolen  
• Security requirement: Limited 
• Scenario 
1) The password is too weak. 
2) The connection is intercepted, and the password is read. 
3) The cookie session is stolen 
4) The password in the data bases are stolen 
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Internal user that causes a data breach 
• Probability: Maximal 
• Impact: Strong 
• Security requirement: Limited 
• Scenario  
1) A user forgot to lock his session when he leaves his desktop. 
2) Export data on a support outside the application (hard copy, drive) 
Adding data into the system without the proper consent 
• Probability: Strong 
• Impact: Maximal. Being in violation with the data privacy 
 Regulation. 
  
• Security requirement: Respected 
• Apprehended events: Not respect the data protection law 
• Scenario 
1) An admin decides to import data into the system from another database 
2) An Eplo collect data themselves during an event without getting the consent. 
3) The website collect data without consent. 
 
Send private data to a third party 
• Probability: strong 
• Impact: Maximal. Being in violation with the data privacy 
 Regulation. 
• Security requirement:Private 
• Scenario 
1) By customising the website it’s possible to add some third-party embedded 
code like (Analytics, YouTube videos, google maps, twitter post...) Those 
third-party service could collect data on the data subject so it’s important to 
alert the user on that and first ask for his consent. 
Not being able to answer to a subject access request 
• Probability: Strong  
• Impact: Maximal 
• Security requirement: ? 
• Scenario 
1) The user would like to submit a subject access request but doesn’t have any 
point of contact. 
2) The user submits a subject access request but nobody handles it.  
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The subcontractor does not comply with the Data privacy 
regulation. 
• Probability: medium 
• Impact: critical 
• Security requirement: Limited 
• Scenario 
1) The subcontractor uses subcontractor that are not compliant 
2) The subcontractor does not have an adequacy mechanism for hosting his data 
in the US 
 
The website is not available 
• Probability: medium 
• Impact: Strong 
• Security requirement: 60 minutes 
• Scenario 
1) the server got a Ddos attack 
2) The server crashes 
3) Too many users connected and generate a lot of request on the server. 
 
The database is accessed by non-authorise actor 
• Probability: medium 
• Impact: Strong 
• Security requirement:Limited 
• Scenario 
1)network access from outside 
2)network access from inside 
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The database is lost or its integrity compromised 
• Probability: medium 
• Impact: Critical 
• Security requirement:Full 
• Scenario 
1) The database server crashes 
2) The hard drive is compromised 
3) Someone else uses the same database and successfully overwrite some data. 
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Action plan to mitigate the risks 
User Session stolen 
 
To mitigate this menace several measures will be put in place. 
 
• The subcontractor will have to set a minimum complexity for the password of 8 
characters with at least one number, one letter and one special character. The 
system will also oblige the user to change his password every 90 days. 
• Control panels and public pages will have to be protected by SSL encryption. 
• Strong Encryption such as AES256 or TLS 1.2 for all “highly sensitive” 
communications, including transfer of customer data into their nation database 
must be used. 
• All passwords will be hashed using the Bcrypt hashing algorithm and will never 
be stored in clear text. 
• The secure flag for the session cookie has to be set so the cookie is sent only if 
the connection is secure. 
Internal user that causes a data breach 
• Like we said when we defined the perimeter of this study, a very important point 
is the data privacy. This new interest is there because of the new GDPR regulation 
that entered into force in May 2018. This regulation says that for all the new 
projects, the data privacy by design must be applied and the awareness of the 
employees must be raised. To mitigate the risks here several training will be 
organised about the tools itself, what we can do with it, how to process the data 
subject. 
 
• A basic training will also be organised to present the new regulation, during this 
training concept like free and informative consent, data subject right, how to 
process rightfully the data… 
 
• All the users have their own loggin and password, this will allow to log all the 
process done in the application and eventually detect a data breach. 
 
Adding data into the system without the proper consent 
 
• Part of this menace will be mitigated with the previous points measure (training 
and raising the awareness) 
• Only the admin profile will be able to add data into the system, and first they 
need to get the green light from the data protection expert from the unit. The 
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expert will analyse if the data have been rightfully collected with a legal basis 
and if they can be used on the platform. 
• On the website, in the subscription form there is a check box unticked by default 
that explain why we need the data asked to the data subject. Furthermore, in this 
text there is a link to the data privacy policy of the website. Only when the user 
checks this box, he is able to submit the form. The consent will be stored with a 
timestamp in the database.  
Send private data to a third party 
On this subject the regulation is quite clear, the data subject must be aware if his data is sent 
to a third party and his consent must be obtained before sending his data. That’s what they 
call opt-out by default.  
• To avoid this when the user arrives for the first time on the website all 
the third-party services (analytics, videos, maps…) are disabled. A 
banner is displayed with a message informing the data subject about the 
third-party services present on the website and 3 buttons 
1. Accept all: when clicked the banner disappears and all the third-party 
services are loaded. 
2. Refuse: the banner disappears and instead of the third-party services we 
have a blurred image with a message “to display this content accept the 
cookies” and a button accept 
3. Personalise: it opens a pop-up, in this pop for all the third-party services 
there is a accept or refuse button. 
 
Of course, this pop-up can be displayed later by a link in the footer. 
 
Not being able to answer to a subject access request 
The data subject has the right to submit subject access request and the unit have 1 month to 
reply. If needed they can warn the subject and tell him that the process can take up to 2 
months. 
• To allow the user to do these requests a functional mail box will be 
created (dataProtection@groundgame.eu). This functional mail box will 
be consulted every week by the data protection specialist of the unit. This 
person will have one month to analyse the request, accept it or not and 
reply to the user. To help him, the specialist can consult the data 
protection coordinator of the DG and the data protection officer of the 
European Parliament. The data controller will have to be added in the 
loop when a decision is reached and will have to validate it. 
• To keep a trace of all data breach or S.A.R. a Jira project will be created 
in which every incident will be logged. 
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The subcontractor does not comply with the data protection 
regulation 
To mitigate this risk a series of close will be added to the contract. 
 
• The data processor shall be compliant with the Regulation on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data. In this regard, the data processor shall carry out a Data 
Protection Impact Assessment in accordance with Article 35 of the General Data 
Protection Regulation and provide the data controller with the results thereof as a 
deliverable of the contract. 
• As of a date specified by the data processor to the data controller, the personal 
data collected and processed for the purpose of the contract shall be stored solely 
in the EU by any means and shall not be transferred outside the EU. Moreover, 
all data operations necessary for the purpose of the contract shall be processed 
within the EU(This is a request done by the data protection officer). 
• No data operation shall take place without prior written approval of the data 
controller, including transfers of personal data. 
• Interactions with data subject shall only take place via the data controller. 
• The data controller shall be entitled to request the data processor to implement 
any additional technical or organisational measure necessary to comply with the 
General Data Protection Regulation. 
• Where the Contractor subcontracts its obligations under this contract, it shall do 
only by way of sub-contracting agreement which impose the same obligations on 
the sub-contractor as are imposed on the contractor under this contract. 
 
The website is not available 
• Continuous monitoring of the system libraries and configuration must be 
performed. 
 
• Weekly analysis of traffic will be performed to update the appropriate WAF rules, analyse 
system usage and performance, and to discuss new threat vectors that need to be 
proactively mitigated. 
 
• 24/7 monitoring of the system that will automatically detect and trigger an incident if an 
urgent change is required to improve the performance of the system. 
 
 
The database is accessed by non-authorised actor 
• The application will have an isolated database, where the data is separate from other 
customers’ data. 
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• Access to the databases can only occur within the Virtual Private Network where the 
application lives and cannot be accessed without the authorization to that network. 
• Server access will be reserved to the Engineering Teams and will only be used to analyse 
issues to the infrastructure or problems.  
• All access and interaction must be logged. 
 
The database is lost or its integrity compromised 
• The integrity of data will be reasonably protected from loss and degradation through 
daily redundancy backups. 
 
• The data will also be backed up in the cloud on a weekly basis, to ensure that copies 
exist in the case of catastrophic database failure. 
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Annex 2 LINDDUN case study 
Data flow diagram 
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MAPPING TABLE template 
The data flow diagram is used to create the following table. 
 
 
 L I N D D U N 
ENTITY        
Data subject X X    X  
Admin X X    X  
Super admin X X    X  
Sender Grid X X     X 
Stats gathering X X    X X 
        
PROCESS        
User portal X X X X X  X 
Admin portal X X X X X  X 
Manage profile X X X X X  X 
Manage user X X X X X  X 
Send email blast X X X X X  X 
Manage profile X X X X X  X 
        
DATA STORE        
NB database X X X X X  X 
        
DATA FLOW        
Login DS (1-3) X X X X X X X 
Token + cookies ds(1-3) X X X X X X X 
Login AD(2-4) X X X X X X X 
Token + cookies ad(2-4) X X X X X X X 
Personal data(3-5) X X X X X X X 
Profil(3-5) X X X X X  X 
Crud (4-6) X X X X X  X 
User data (4-6) X X X X X  X 
Datasubject list(4-7) X X X X X  X 
Stats(4-7) X X X X X  X 
Personal data(5-8) X X X X X  X 
Profil(5-8) X X X X X  X 
Crud(6-8) X X X X X  X 
User data(6-8) X X X X X  X 
Send(7-10) X X X X X  X 
Ack(7-10) X X X X X  X 
Manage and support(8-11) X X X X X  X 
Data(8-11) X X X X X  X 
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Identify threat scenario 
 
Assumptions 
For the analysed system we do the following assumptions: 
5. The processes that are done in the back-end are considered 
protected since the back-end has passed the pen-test done by 
DG-ITEC. The only threat that could come from inside it means 
people are having access to the application. 
6. For the same raison as point 1 the communications between the 
process are also considered safe. 
7. The communication between the entity and the system are not 
considered as safe since the entity can produce data breach if 
they do not respect the guidelines and also the communication 
channel is not considered as secure. 
8. The data base is not considered as secure since admin have 
access to it and can retrieve information. 
9. There is a risk of non-repudiation since the communication 
could be intercept and an attacker could take action in the name 
of the user. 
10. Detectability is a threat since one could deduce that is a user 
pledge to vote on the plat-form it means that he is pro-eu. 
11. The non-compliance is one of the main threats, specially whit 
this project that is used for the European elections. 
12. The dataflow that is used to send email is a threat since personal 
data are sent to a third party. 
13. For the same reason as the point 8, likability of the dataflow (7-
10) is also a threat since third party could use the personal data. 
14. Identifiability of the data flow 8-11 is a threat since there is no 
control on what data is consult by the super admin. 
15. The spoofing of the data flow 1-3 and 2-4 are considered as 
threat since it could lead to a data breach. 
16. The unawareness concern sonly the entity Data subject since 
they are the only one who provide personal data. 
17. As for the back-end the database is considered secured from 
outsider attacks. 
18. Attack between the system and third party like grid sender are 
not considered as a threat. 
19. All the back-end processes are considered not corruptible. 
20. The login system is considered as secure and well implemented. 
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Threat scenarios 
For this part the threat tree of LINDDUN is used. https://linddun.org/catalog.php 
T01  
Spoofing of the entity user or admin 
Summary 
The attacker obtains the credentials of a user worst an admin and can then access to the data 
Primary mis-actor 
• An outsider attacker with a lot of competences. 
• An internal attacker with low competences 
Basic path 
• The attacker gain access to a computer with an already logged account 
• The attacker intercepts the communication. 
• The attacker stole the session cookies 
Consequence: 
The attacker gains access to the system 
Reference to threat tree node(s) 
I_E_12, I_E_13,I_E_20 
T02 
The data subject is not aware of what information are collected and why. 
Summary 
The data subject not clearly informed on the data that are collected and the purpose. 
 
Primary mis-actor 
• The data controller and the developers that implement the portal. 
Basic path 
• Data are collected without explicit consent when the user land on the website. 
• Data that are not really needed are collected. 
Consequence: 
The data subject is not correctly informed, and the consent is not valid. 
Reference to threat tree node(s) 
U_3,U_4,U_5 
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T03 
Non compliance of sub-processor(sender-grid) 
Summary 
The contractor could use sub-contractor that does not respect the regulation. 
Primary mis-actor 
• The contractor 
Basic path 
• Use third party services without obliged them to respect the regulation. 
Consequence: 
The data subject rights are not respected and the platform is not compliant. It could lead to 
administrative fines and reputational damages. 
Reference to threat tree node(s) 
NC_3 
T04 without consent 
Data available to untrusted third party 
Summary 
The data are transmitted by mistake to third party actors 
Primary mis-actor 
• The developer team 
• The ground game team 
Basic path 
• The developers or the ground game team uses third party features like google 
analytics, embedded Youtube link, twitter wall that could send data to third party 
Consequence: 
Personal data are sent to third party actors that could link the data. 
Reference to threat tree node(s) 
L_DF_6, L_DF_7,I_DF_5,I_DF_6 
T05 
The data are cross linked with other databases. 
Summary 
Even if in this project there is no sensitive data collected, the cross reference with other 
database could lead to sensitive data collection. 
Primary mis-actor 
• The ground game team 
• The contractor who have access to the database 
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Basic path 
• The ground game team has access to other database, they could for example cross 
reference data subject that comes to an event with the application data base to target 
them. 
• The contractor could link the EP database and cross reference it with social media to 
get additional information. 
Consequence: 
Additional personal data could be collected without the consent to the data subject. 
Reference to threat tree node(s) 
L_DS_3 
T06 
Process on personal data is done with no real or bad purpose. 
Summary 
Administrators and super administrators have illimited access to personal data. It is important 
that control on this access is implemented. 
Primary mis-actor 
• The ground game team 
• The super administrators 
Basic path 
• Someone access to the data base with no real reason and extract information. 
Consequence 
The data are processed whit no defined purpose. 
Reference to threat tree node(s) 
NR_P_1 
 
Select corresponding privacy enhancing 
technology 
In this section solutions will be proposed to mitigate the risks. 
T01 Spoofing of the entity user or admin 
• The subcontractor will have to set a minimum complexity for the password of 8 
characters with at least one number, one letter and one special character. The 
system will also oblige the user to change his password every 90 days. 
• Control panels and public pages will have to be protected by SSL encryption. 
131 
 
• Strong Encryption such as AES256 or TLS 1.2 for all “highly sensitive” 
communications, including transfer of customer data into their nation database 
must be used. 
• All passwords will be hashed using the Bcrypt hashing algorithm and will never 
be stored in clear text. 
• The secure flag for the session cookie has to be set so the cookie is sent only if 
the connection is secure. 
 
T02 The data subject is not aware of what information are 
collected and why. 
On the website, in the subscription form, there is a check box unticked by default that explain 
why we need the data asked to the data subject. Furthermore, in this text there is a link to the 
data privacy policy of the website. Only when the user checks this box, he is able to submit 
the form. The consent will be stored with a timestamp in the database 
T03 Noncompliance of sub-processor(sender-grid) 
Where the Contractor subcontracts its obligations under this contract, it shall do only by way 
of sub-contracting agreement which impose the same obligations on the sub-contractor as are 
imposed on the contractor under this contract. 
 
T04 Data available to untrusted third party without consent 
• To avoid this when the user arrives for the first time on the website all the third-party 
services (analytics, videos, maps…) are disabled. A banner is displayed with a 
message informing the data subject about the third-party services present on the 
website and 3 buttons 
• Accept all: when clicked the banner disappears and all the third-party services are 
loaded. 
• Refuse: the banner disappears and instead of the third-party services we have a blurred 
image with a message “to display this content accept the cookies” and a button accept 
• Personalise: it opens a pop-up, in this pop for all the third-party services there is a 
accept or refuse button. 
 
T05 The data are cross linked with other databases. 
• The application will have an isolated database, where the data is separate from other 
customers’ data. 
• No process on the personal data can be done without the agreement of the data controler 
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T06 Process on personal data is done with no real or bad 
purpose. 
• No access to the data can be done without a proper credential and access rights. 
• All the process on the data must be logged. 
• The contractor will have defined procedure for the maintenance team and the support 
team that also have access to the databases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
